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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This dissertation comprises five chapters on economic uncertainty1. Chapter
1 provides a brief overview of the literature and the motivation for this dis-
sertation. Moreover, the chapter also introduces the concept of uncertainty
and presents different measures of uncertainty. Chapter 2 examines the
role of economic uncertainty in explaining the U.S. Initial Public Offering
(IPO) issue cycles, while chapter 3 analyzes the impact of uncertainty on
the U.S. housing market. Chapter 4 quantifies the effects of uncertainty
on (disaggregated) import flows using German data and is accompanied by
an analysis on the revealed comparative advantage in trade of the EU-27
countries. Chapter 5 concludes.
The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the research on
uncertainty and explains the motivation behind the dissertation, while the
section 1.2 introduces the notion of uncertainty and presents various proxies
for economic uncertainty which are used frequently in the dissertation. Sec-
tion 1.3 presents descriptive statistics and causality tests of the uncertainty
measures.
1In this dissertation, the terms “economic uncertainty" and “uncertainty" are used inter-
changeably.
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1.1 Overview and Motivation
“Uncertainty is largely behind the dramatic collapse in demand. Given the
uncertainty, why build a new plant, or introduce a new product? Better to
pause until the smoke clears."
Oliver Blanchard2(The Economist, January 29, 2009, p. 84.)
In recent years, research on economic uncertainty as a factor influencing
decisions of economic agents has enjoyed increased popularity, reflecting the
recent growth of this strand of literature following the financial crisis. There
are two main factors behind this boost in interest in uncertainty. First, the
policy attention on the topic has increased due to the fact that uncertainty
was likely a major driver of the Great Recession. Second, the increased
availability of empirical proxies for uncertainty has facilitated empirical in-
vestigations.
Two main transmission mechanisms through which uncertainty might
affect real economic activities have been discussed intensely. Real options ef-
fect arises in periods with high uncertainty under the assumption of (partial)
irreversibility of investments (e.g., Bernanke, 1983; McDonald and Siegel,
1986; Pindyck, 1991; Bloom, 2009). The authors argue that firms look at
their investment choices as a series of option and emphasize the importance
of waiting: in periods of high uncertainty, firms wait and gather more infor-
mation before making an irreversible investment decision. For example, if a
firm is uncertain about the future demand for its products it may not want
to invest in a new plant to increase production capacity, but prefers to wait
and postpone the investment to future periods when uncertainty dissolves.
This real options effect relies on firms possessing the ability to wait and irre-
versible (or at least costly to reverse) investment decisions; if the investment
can be easily reverted without substantial costs or the firms immediately
want to launch a new product, the option to wait may not be valuable.
Moreover, models combining uncertainty shocks with some sort of finan-
cial frictions have also attracted a lot of attention in the past few years (e.g.,
Dorofeenko et al., 2008, 2014; Arellano et al., 2012; Christiano et al., 2014;
Gilchrist et al., 2014), which is most likely motivated by the recent global
economic and financial crisis. For instance, Christiano et al. (2014) include
a Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist financial accelerator mechanism in a standard
2Formerly Chief Economist of the IMF.
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monetary dynamic general equilibrium model. In this setup, entrepreneurs
transform raw capital into productive capital with uncertainty about the suc-
cess of the transformation for each entrepreneur prior to the transformation
process. Uncertainty is modeled as the time-varying second moment of the
technology which converts raw capital into productive capital and only firms
with high productive capital experience success. The authors show that this
type of uncertainty shock accounts for a large share of the fluctuations in
GDP.
While the aforementioned literature are primarily theoretical works on
the impact of uncertainty, there are only a limited number of empirical stud-
ies in this relatively new strand of literature. The goal of this dissertation
is to widen the understanding of the impact of uncertainty on the economy
by analyzing empirical data. In particular, the focus of this dissertation lies
on quantifying the impact of uncertainty on financial, housing and trade
markets.
1.2 The Notion of Uncertainty and Uncertainty
Measures
Frank Knight (1921), the famous Chicago economist, provides the modern
definition of uncertainty and defines uncertainty as peoples inability to fore-
cast the likelihood of events happening (Knight, 1921). In contrast, he relates
risk to the known probability distribution over a set of events. For example,
flipping a fair coin does not qualify as uncertain since the likelihood of heads
or tails is known; it is, however, risky because there is a 50% chance of ob-
taining heads with a coin flip (Bloom, 2014). The disentanglement of risk
and uncertainty is certainly often not possible with empirical data: Never-
theless, it helps to clarify the difference between risk and uncertainty. In
the empirical analyses, however, I follow the literature on uncertainty and
use uncertainty measures which also incorporate elements of risk. I refer to
Bloom (2014) for a more elaborated discussion of uncertainty and risk.
Uncertainty is an amorphous concept for which no objective measure ex-
ists. In the following, I present different economic uncertainty measures
which have been used frequently in studies analyzing the impact of uncer-
tainty on the economy. These measures are also used frequently as proxies
for different aspects of economic uncertainty in this dissertation.
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Macroeconomic uncertainty proposed by Jurado et al. (2015) The
macroeconomic uncertainty (Macro Uncertainty) measure proposed by Ju-
rado et al. (2015) builds on the unforecastable components of a broad set of
macroeconomic variables. Jurado et al. (2015) estimate Macro Uncertainty as
the conditional standard deviation “of the purely unforecastable component
of the future value”. More specifically, they calculate for Ny = 132 macroeco-
nomic time series yjt ∈Y = y1t, ..., y132t the conditional standard deviation of
the unpredictable component of the h-step-ahead realization:
U yjt(h)=
√
E[(yjt+h−E[yjt+h|I t])2|I t], (1.1)
where yjt+h−E[yjt+h|I t] denotes the h-step-ahead forecast error and E[.|I t]
the expectation taken conditional on the information set I t which is available
at time t. The Macro Uncertainty is then computed as:
U yt (h)=
Ny∑
j=1
1
Ny
U yjt(h). (1.2)
To compute U yjt(h), Jurado et al. (2015) first form factors from a large set
of economic and financial3 indicators, which represent I t. These factors are
used to estimate the expected squared forecast error E[(yjt+h−E[yjt+h|I t])2|I t].
This measure captures the predictability of the overall macroeconomic envi-
ronment; the less predictable the macroeconomic variables, the higher the
macroeconomic uncertainty. I use the one-month-ahead measure throughout
the dissertation, since the data are at the monthly frequency.
Financial uncertainty proposed by Ludvigson et al. (2016) The com-
putation of the financial uncertainty (Finance Uncertainty) measure by Lud-
vigson et al. (2016) follows Jurado et al. (2015) but is based on 147 financial
variables instead of 132 macroeconomic variables.
Economic policy uncertainty proposed by Baker et al. (2016) The
economic policy uncertainty (Policy Uncertainty) measure proposed by Baker
et al. (2016) proxies for movements in policy-related economic uncertainty.
The index quantifies the frequency of articles in 10 leading U.S. newspapers
3For the computation of Macro Uncertainty, Jurado et al. (2015) also include 25 financial
variables.
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that contain the following triple of words: “economic" or “economy"; “un-
certain" or “uncertainty"; and one or more of “congress", “deficit", “Federal
Reserve", “legislation", “regulation" or “White House".
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index The Chicago Board
Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) estimates the 30-day expected volatil-
ity of the S&P 500 index. The formula4 used in the VIX calculation is:
σ2 = 2
T
∑
i
∆K
K2i
eRTQ(K i)− 1T [
F
K0
−1]2, (1.3)
where
• T is the time to expiration,
• F the forward index level derived from index option prices,
• K0 the first strike below the forward index level F,
• K i the strike price of the i-th out-of-the-money option; a call if K i >K0;
and a put if K i <K0; both out and call if K i =K0,
• ∆K i the interval between strike prices,
• R the risk-free interest rate to expiration,
• Q(K i) the midpoint of the bid-ask spread for each option with strike K i,
• and σ= V IX100 .
The VIX is therefore VIX= σ∗100. The underlying components of the VIX
calculation are put and call options with more than 23 days and less than 37
days to expiration. For a more detailed explanation of the VIX, see the “VIX
White Paper" on the homepage5 of the Chicago Board Options Exchange.
4The formula is taken from the “VIX White Paper".
5https://www.cboe.com/products/vix-index-volatility/vix-options-and-futures/vix-
index/the-vix-index-calculation.
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1.3 Descriptive Statistics and Causality of the
Uncertainty Measures
Table 1.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the four aforementioned uncer-
tainty measures. Although the computation procedures for Macro Uncer-
tainty and Finance Uncertainty are the same, the mean as well as the volatil-
ity of Finance Uncertainty are substantially higher. This reflects the more
unpredictable nature of the underlying 147 financial variables compared to
the 132 macroeconomic series.
The column ERS (Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock) test statistic contains the
test statistics of the Dickey-Fuller GLS unit root test which is proposed by
Elliott et al. (1996)6. The lag lengths for the individual tests are chosen based
on the Schwarz criterion. The null hypothesis of containing a unit root can
be rejected for all time series. Moreover, using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test also leads to the same conclusions.
Figure 1.1 depicts the evolution of the four uncertainty measures over
time for the period 1990M1-2015M12, while Table 1.2 displays the cross-
correlation of the measures. All uncertainty measures are positively cor-
related and show dramatic increases during the financial crisis. Finance
Uncertainty and the VIX are particularly highly correlated, which is not
surprising, since both measures proxy the financial market uncertainty.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of the Uncertainty Measures
Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
ERS
test
statistic
Macro Uncertainty 312 0.664 0.088 0.557 1.083 -3.01***
Finance Uncertainty 312 0.900 0.184 0.643 1.542 -2.92***
Economic Policy Uncertainty 312 106.4 33.87 57.20 245.1 -4.31***
VIX 312 19.8347.641 10.82162.642-4.61***
Descriptive statistics of the uncertainty measures, 1990M1-2015M12.
6The authors show that this test dominates the conventional Dickey-Fuller test in terms
of small-sample size properties and power.
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Figure 1.1: Development of the Uncertainty Measures,
1990M1-2015M12.
Table 1.2: Correlation of Uncertainty Measures
Macro Un-
certainty
Finance
Uncer-
tainty
Policy Un-
certainty
VIX
Macro Uncertainty 1
Finance Uncertainty 0.714 1
Policy Uncertainty 0.352 0.381 1
VIX 0.650 0.853 0.456 1
Correlation of the uncertainty measures, 1990m1-2015M12.
Table 1.3 summarizes the p-value of the Granger causality test results
for all uncertainty measures. For example, in order to obtain the test results
in column (2), the following equation was estimated7:
7Two lags are recommended by the Schwarz criterion.
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MUt =
2∑
j=1
α jMUt− j+
2∑
j=1
β jFUt− j+
2∑
j=1
δ jPUt− j+
2∑
j=1
γ jV IX t− j+ut8. (1.4)
Subsequently, the null hypotheses β1 = 0&β2 = 0, δ1 = 0&δ2 = 0 and γ1 =
0&γ2 = 0 were tested to determine if Finance Uncertainty, Policy Uncertainty
and the VIX are Granger causal for Macro Uncertainty, respectively. Corre-
sponding estimations and tests were also performed to obtain the remaining
columns. There is a high level of interconnectedness between the different
uncertainty proxies. First, at the 5% significance level, Macro Uncertainty is
significantly explained by all other measures of uncertainty. Second, Finance
Uncertainty and the VIX significantly affect one another. Moreover, Finance
Uncertainty helps to predict all remaining uncertainty proxies and, therefore,
seems to be an important driver of the overall level of economic uncertainty.
Table 1.3: Granger Causality Tests
(2) Macro
Uncer-
tainty
(3)
Finance
Uncer-
tainty
(4) Policy
Uncer-
tainty
(5) VIX
Macro Uncertainty 0.365 0.800 0.380
Finance Uncertainty 0.016** 0.019** 0.000***
Policy Uncertainty 0.022** 0.025** 0.537
VIX 0.015** 0.005*** 0.1343
Causality tests of the uncertainty measures, 1990m1-2015M12. * indicates significance at
10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level.
8MU denotes Macro Uncertainty, FU Finance Uncertainty and PU Policy Uncertainty.
CHAPTER 2
Uncertainty, the Option to Wait and IPO Issue
Cycles
Abstract: This paper uses recently developed uncertainty measures to ex-
amine the role of economic uncertainty in explaining the U.S. Initial Public
Offering (IPO) issue cycles. Time series estimations reveal a strong and
robust negative impact of macroeconomic and financial uncertainty on the
IPO activity. For instance, an increase in macroeconomic uncertainty by one
standard deviation lowers the number of monthly IPOs by roughly four in
the long-run, which equals 20% of the average number of monthly IPOs. In
response to an uncertainty shock, both the reduction of the number of IPO
filings and the rise of withdrawn IPOs contribute to the lower number of
IPOs. These results support the view that firms value the option to wait
and tend not to go public during periods of high uncertainty, which is akin
to the occurrence of the real options effect in periods of high uncertainty if
investments are irreversible. However, there is no significant impact of eco-
nomic policy uncertainty on the IPO market. The study also finds that high
uncertainty worsens the IPO market condition by depressing stock prices,
output, investor optimism and consumer sentiment.
9
2.1. Introduction 10
2.1 Introduction
The cyclical nature of the number of initial public offerings (IPO number)
is a highly debated phenomenon. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ibbotson
et al. (1988, 1994) highlight the substantial fluctuation of new IPO issues
and more recent studies provide numerous explanations for the hot and cold
IPO markets. Notably, the comprehensive empirical studies of Lowry (2003)
and Ivanov and Lewis (2008) identify economic growth, stock market return,
investor optimism and consumer sentiment as the most important determi-
nants of IPO number. This paper provides an alternative view and argues
that uncertainty surrounding the overall economy is also a key driver of IPO
issue cycles.
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of IPO number and the macroeconomic
uncertainty (Macro Uncertainty) measure by Jurado et al. (2015) for the
period 1981M1-2016M3: there is a negative correlation of -0.43 between the
two series and both variables exhibit pronounced cycles. If macroeconomic
uncertainty is very high and exceeds for example its 80-th percentile1, the
high level of uncertainty lasts for a considerable amount of periods before it
dissolves2. For instance, the macroeconomic uncertainty exceeds its 80-th
percentile for 32 consecutive months during the financial crisis (2007M10-
2010M5); for 28 consecutive months between 1981M1-1983M4 and for 14
consecutive months between 2000M12-2002M1. During those periods of
high uncertainty IPO number drops quickly.
In fact, the president of NASDAQ, Adena Friedman, also relates IPO
number to uncertainty and states3
“It’s an uncertain environment to go public in ...”
(Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2016.)4
to comment the sharp drop in the number of U.S. IPOs by 75% in the first
quarter of 2016. However, neither the statistical reliability of the impact
1Exceeding its 80-th percentile means that Macro Uncertainty is greater than 80% of the
values of Macro Uncertainty in the sample.
2Jurado et al. (2015), Ludvigson et al. (2016) and Lee et al. (2016) have documented and
extensively discussed the high persistence of uncertainty shocks.
3https://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaqs-friedman-says-ipo-environment-still-uncertain-
1453295483
4There are numerous popular press articles which relate IPO activity to uncertainty
including the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, CNBC and the Washington Post.
2.1. Introduction 11
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1.
1
M
ac
ro
 U
nc
er
ta
in
ty
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
N
um
be
r o
f I
P
O
s
1980m1 1985m1 1990m1 1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1 2015m1
Macro Uncertainty 80 pct Macro Uncertainty 90 pct
Number of IPOs Macro Uncertainty
Figure 2.1: Macro Uncertainty and the Number of IPOs
Time series of the number of IPOs and Macro Uncertainty, 1981M1-
2016M3. “Macro Uncertainty 80 pct" and “Macro Uncertainty 90
pct" denote the periods in which Macro Uncertainty is greater
than 80% and 90% of the values of Macro Uncertainty in the
sample, respectively. Data on IPO number are provided by
Jay Ritter (https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/), while Macro
Uncertainty is collected from the website of Sydney Ludvigson
(http://www.sydneyludvigson.com/data-and-appendixes/).
of economic uncertainty on the IPO activity nor the mechanisms of impact
have been examined. The lack of appropriate uncertainty measures may
have hindered an in-depth statistical analysis. This study fills this gap by
using recently developed uncertainty measures and evaluate their impact on
the IPO market. More specifically, I use the Macro Uncertainty by Jurado
et al. (2015), the Finance Uncertainty by Ludvigson et al. (2016), the Policy
Uncertainty by Baker et al. (2016) and the VIX to quantify the impact of
uncertainty on the IPO number, the number of filed IPOs and the number
of withdrawn IPOs. Moreover, I also present a stylized model in which the
impact mechanisms of uncertainty on the IPO decision can be retraced. The
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model considers an IPO as an irreversible investment with the possibility of
delay, and borrows from the literature on irreversibility of investment and
uncertainty (e.g., Pindyck, 1991; Bloom, 2009).
Using the sample period 1990M1-2015M12 and controlling for a broad set
of IPO market determinant variables, I find that a one standard deviation
increase in macroeconomic uncertainty decreases IPO number by roughly
four, which is 20% of the average number of IPOs per month. This result
is driven by both the reduction of the number of filed IPOs and the rise of
the number of withdrawn IPOs, and suggests that firms value the option
of waiting instead of immediately going public during periods of high uncer-
tainty. Furthermore, I find that uncertainty also distresses the overall IPO
market condition by depressing stock prices, output, investor optimism and
consumer sentiment. The results are qualitatively similar and robust for the
VIX, Macro Uncertainty and Finance Uncertainty in numerous specifications.
Policy Uncertainty, however, does not display a significant effect on the IPO
activity.
2.1.1 Related IPO Literature
Numerous explanations for the hot and cold IPO markets have been proposed
in the finance literature. Ritter (1991) relates IPO waves to the sentiments of
investors, whereas Rajan and Servaes (1997) note that more firms complete
IPOs when analysts are overoptimistic. Choe et al. (1993) and Yung et al.
(2008) focus on the role of adverse selection but arrive at contradicting con-
clusions, since they make different assumptions about the serial dependence
of innovation. However, the results of Helwege and Liang (2004) suggest that
hot markets are not driven by adverse selection costs but are more likely af-
fected by greater investor optimism. Lowry and Schwert (2002), Benveniste
et al. (2003) and Alti (2005) highlight the role of information spillovers of
pioneer IPOs which facilitate the pricing of subsequent issues and thus at-
tract more firms to the IPO market. Pástora˘ and Veronesi (2005) emphasize
the importance of firms’ expectation about (aggregated) profitability in ex-
plaining IPO number and Chemmanur and He (2011) argue that firms go
public to grab market share from competitors after a productivity shock. The
comprehensive studies of Lowry (2003) and Ivanov and Lewis (2008) test
the empirical relevance of numerous explanations and identify past initial
returns of IPOs, economic growth, stock market return, the term spread, the
optimism of investors and consumer sentiment as the most important deter-
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minants of IPO number. I, thefore, include theses factors as control variables
in the regression analyses.
2.1.2 The Impact Mechanism of Uncertainty on the IPO
Decision
Typically the literature on uncertainty distinguishes between uncertainty
and risk; risk is related to the known probability distribution over a set of
events, whereas uncertainty is associated with peoples’ inability to forecast
the likelihood of events happening (Knight, 1921). In this context, flipping a
fair coin is not uncertain, since the likelihood of head or tail is known, but it
is risky because there is a 50% chance to obtain head with a coin flip (Bloom,
2014). The disentanglement of risk and uncertainty is certainly often not
possible with real world data. Nevertheless, it helps to clarify the difference
between risk and uncertainty, and therefore facilitates the theoretical con-
sideration of how uncertainty might affect the IPO decision in the current
subsection. In the empirical analysis, however, I follow the literature on
uncertainty and use uncertainty measures which also incorporate elements
of risk.
Economic uncertainty could impact the IPO activity through different
ways. First of all, given the irreversible nature of an IPO and the option
to go public at a different point in time, high uncertainty may increase the
option value of waiting of firms which consider the timing of their IPOs. For
instance, a firm goes public only if it expects to raise at least as much capital
as the firm is worth. However, if an uncertainty shock occurs and the firm
is uncertain about how much it can expect to raise from the IPO, the firm
may delay the IPO until uncertainty subsides. In addition, Lowry (2003)
finds that firms go public if the business outlook is good and their demand
for new capital to boost investment is high. If firms are uncertain about the
economic development and thus uncertain about their own capital demand
and associated new investments, they may wait and gather more information
instead of immediately going public to raise capital for new investments. The
reasoning that firms decrease investments in periods of high uncertainty is
also supported by numerous studies (e.g., Bernanke, 1983; Pindyck, 1991;
Gulen and Ion, 2015).
The rationale that firms tend not to go public in periods of high uncer-
tainty is consistent with the occurrence of the real options effect due to
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uncertainty if investments are irreversible as described in Pindyck (1991):
"There will be a value to waiting (i.e., an opportunity cost to investing today
rather than waiting for information to arrive) whenever the investment is
irreversible and the net payoff from the investment evolves stochastically
over time". In other words, when a firm makes an irreversible investment
expenditure, it essentially gives up the possibility of waiting for new informa-
tion that might affect the desirability or timing of the expenditure; it cannot
disinvest should market conditions change adversely. Going public also rep-
resents a form of “irreversible investment”, since a firm typically has only
one IPO with an associated payoff which depends on the (time-varying) mar-
ket condition. The higher the uncertainty about the market conditions, the
more valuable the option to wait. A comparable waiting attitude can also be
observed in the merger market as suggested by Bhagwat et al. (2016). They
find that a one standard deviation increase in the VIX, a proxy for financial
uncertainty, is associated with a 6% drop in public merger deal activity. Sim-
ilarly, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) highlight the value of waiting in the
IPO market. In their model, however, the option to delay an IPO is valuable
if waiting allows a firm to gather more information about its own production
function.
Figure 2.2 illustrates a stylized model of a firm’s decision about the tim-
ing of its IPO and how uncertainty might affect this decision. Consider a
firm with a true firm value of $100, and this firm could raise $120 (good
market condition) with probability of p and $80 (bad market condition) with
probability 1− p in an IPO. According to the notion of risk and uncertainty
from above, going public is risky in general but not uncertain. It takes one
period of time to prepare the IPO. For example, if in t= 0 the firm decides to
go public the factual IPO takes place in t= 1. The firm decides to go public
only if it expects to raise at least as much capital as the firm is worth. For
simplicity, the discount rate is zero. In t= 0, if there is no uncertainty at all,
the firm assigns a value to p and decides to go public if p≥ 50%. However, if
there is a one-period uncertainty shock in t= 0 in the spirit of Knight (1921),
the firm is not able to assign a value to p and postpones the IPO decision to
period t= 1 when the uncertainty shock subsides.
Analogously, if all IPO-interested firms are homogeneous and are all hit
by the same one-period uncertainty shock in period t = 0, there will be no
IPOs in t = 1. As the uncertainty shock disappears in t = 1 and p ≥ 0.5,
all firms go public in t = 2. For a set of heterogeneous firms a common
uncertainty shock may still reduce the number of IPOs in the subsequent
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period if a fraction of those firms experience the shock similarly.
Figure 2.2: Real Option of Waiting
p is the probability to raise $120 as capital (C) in an IPO.
As suggested by Figure 2.1 and the literature on uncertainty, high uncer-
tainty shocks are persistent and thus are likely to impede the IPO number
for a considerable amount of time contributing to the creation of cold IPO
market phases. As uncertainty eventually dissolves, IPO-interested firms
start to go public in the same time slot, which in turn could give rise to IPO
hot market phases.
Last but not least, high uncertainty could overshadow the IPO market
condition by deteriorating the business outlook. For instance, Bloom (2009),
Bansal et al. (2014) and Christiano et al. (2014) conclude that high uncer-
tainty decreases output, consumption and investment5, while other studies
find that uncertainty is negatively related to aggregated growth and asset
prices (e.g., Ozoguz, 2009; Pástora˘ and Veronesi, 2012; Segal et al., 2015). As
pointed out by Pástora˘ and Veronesi (2005) and Pástor et al. (2009), firms
tend to go public if the expected (aggregate) profitability is high. Therefore,
5Some other studies on the impact of uncertainty on the real economy are Bernanke
(1983), Pindyck (1991), Caballero and Pindyck (1996), Bachmann and Bayer (2013),
Caggiano et al. (2014), Dorofeenko et al. (2014) and Leduc and Liu (2016). See Bloom
(2014) for a more comprehensive review of the literature on uncertainty.
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IPO-interested firms may anticipate a decline in expected profitability follow-
ing an uncertainty shock and choose not to go public during periods of high
uncertainty. In context of the presented stylized model, following an uncer-
tainty shock a decline of the business outlook may translate to a decrease of
p and a decline of the payoffs in good and bad IPO market conditions. Both
the drop of the probability to raise capital in a good market condition and the
fall of the potential payoffs make firms less willing to go public.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
data, analyses the time-series properties of the key variables and presents
the econometric model. Section 2.3 examines the impact of uncertainty on the
IPO activity. Section 2.4 investigates the effects of uncertainty on IPO mar-
ket condition variables including S&P 500 return, output growth, investor
optimism and consumer sentiment. Finally, section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data and Econometric Specification
The sample for this study is 1990M1-2015M126 and include monthly data
on IPO activity, four different uncertainty measures and numerous control
variables. Detailed information on the data is presented in the Appendix.
2.2.1 IPO Activity Data
The number of IPOs per month and the average, equal-weighted monthly
IPO initial returns are fetched from the Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (ISR)
database. The initial returns represent the mean, across all IPOs each month,
of the percentage difference between a closing price within the first month
after the IPO and the offer price. A more complete description of the construc-
tion of the data is in Ibbotson et al. (1994). Data on the number of filed IPOs
and the number of withdrawn IPOs are provided by NASDAQ, and cover IPO
activity on the NYSE and the NASDAQ for the period 1997M1-2015M12.
6Since the VIX and the monthly GDP data are not available for earlier periods. However,
analyses with the sample 1980M1-2015M12 omitting monthly GDP deliver qualitatively the
same results for Macro Uncertainty and Finance Uncertainty.
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2.2.2 Uncertainty Measures
Finding an appropriate uncertainty measure is a challenging task, since
uncertainty is an amorphous concept for which no objective measure exists.
This study uses four uncertainty proxies which are based on different ap-
proaches to approximate the latent stochastic process of uncertainty includ-
ing Macro Uncertainty (Jurado et al., 2015), Finance Uncertainty (Ludvigson
et al., 2016), Policy Uncertainty (Baker et al., 2016) and the VIX.
The Macro Uncertainty by Jurado et al. (2015) captures the predictability
of the overall macroeconomic environment; the less predictable the macroeco-
nomic variables, the higher the macroeconomic uncertainty. I decided to use
the one-month-ahead measure, since the data are at a monthly frequency.
The computation of Finance Uncertainty (Ludvigson et al., 2016) follows
Jurado et al. (2015) but uses 147 financial variables instead of 132 macroe-
conomic variables as before. The Policy Uncertainty measure by Baker et
al. (2016) proxies for movements in policy-related economic uncertainty by
quantifying the frequency of articles in 10 leading U.S. newspapers which
contain certain combinations of key words on economic policy uncertainty.
The VIX estimates the 30-day expected volatility of the S&P 500 index. See
section 1.2 for a more detailed description of the four uncertainty measures.
One could argue that the presented uncertainty measures capture a mix-
ture of both uncertainty and risk. However, since these measures are fre-
quently applied in studies that examine the effects of (economic) uncertainty,
I refrain from disentangling (Knightian) uncertainty and risk in the empiri-
cal part of the current paper and refer to a broader definition of uncertainty
which also incorporates components of risk.
According to Lowry (2003), Pástora˘ and Veronesi (2005) and Ivanov and
Lewis (2008), firms consider the condition of both the real economy and the
financial market before they go public. Macro Uncertainty, which also in-
corporates uncertainty components of 25 financial variables, may therefore
be the most potent uncertainty measure to explain the IPO activity, since it
incorporates uncertainty about the real economy and the financial market.
2.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 displays descriptive statistics of the IPO activity variables and the
measures of uncertainty. There is substantial variation of the IPO number as
well as of the number of filed IPOs. The number of withdrawn IPOs reached
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its all time high of 40 in March 2001, in a period in which Macro Uncertainty
exceeds its 90th percentile. Although the computation procedures for Macro
Uncertainty and Finance Uncertainty are the same, the mean as well as the
volatility of Finance Uncertainty are substantially higher. This reflects the
more unpredictable nature of the underlying 147 financial variables used for
the computation of Finance Uncertainty compared to the 132 macroeconomic
series7 which underlie the computation of Macro Uncertainty.
The column ERS (Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock) test statistic contains the
test statistics of the Dickey-Fuller GLS unit root test which is proposed by
Elliott et al. (1996)8. The lag length for the individual tests are chosen with
respect to the Schwarz criterion. The null hypothesis of containing a unit root
can be rejected for all time series. Using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
leads to the same conclusions. The finding that IPO number is stationary is
very much in line with Ivanov and Lewis (2008) who also use monthly data.
The cross-correlation of the uncertainty measures and the IPO number
are presented in Table 2.2. Although the different uncertainty measures may
capture different aspects of economic uncertainty, they are highly positively
correlated indicating common sources of uncertainty or/and spillover effects
of one type of uncertainty on another. Finance Uncertainty and the VIX
exhibit a notably high correlation of 0.85, which is not surprising, since the
VIX also proxies uncertainty surrounding the financial market. Moreover,
all uncertainty measures are strongly negatively correlated with the number
of initial public offerings suggesting an inverse relation between uncertainty
and IPO activity.
7The 132 macroeconomic variables already contain 25 of financial indicators.
8The authors show that this test dominates the conventional Dickey-Fuller test in terms
of small-sample size properties and power.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of IPO Activity Variables and Uncertainty
Measures
Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
ERS test
statistic
Number of IPOs (IPO number) 312 19.669 17.562 0 100 -2.21**
Number of filed IPOs 228 36.236 19.824 5 128 -3.03***
Number of withdrawn IPOs 228 8.820 6.896 0 40 -6.84***
Macro Uncertainty 312 0.664 0.088 0.557 1.083 -3.01***
Finance Uncertainty 312 0.900 0.184 0.643 1.542 -2.92***
Policy Uncertainty 312 106.43 33.87 57.20 245.12 -4.3***
VIX 312 19.834 7.641 10.821 62.642 -4.61***
Sample statistics on IPO number, Macro uncertainty, Finance uncertainty, Policy uncertainty
and VIX for the period 1990M1-2015M12. Sample statistics on the number of filed IPOs
and the number of withdrawn IPOs for the period 1997M1-2015M12. Data on the number of
filed IPOs and the number of withdrawn IPOs are provided by NASDAQ. ERS test statistic
denotes the test statistics of the Dickey-Fuller GLS unit root test proposed by Elliott et
al. (1996). The null hypothesis of containing a unit root can be rejected for all time series
variables. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, ***
indicates significance at 1% level.
Table 2.2: Correlation of IPO Number and the Uncertainty Measures
Number
of IPOs
Macro
Uncer-
tainty
Finance
Uncer-
tainty
Policy
Uncer-
tainty
VIX
Number of IPOs 1
Macro Uncertainty -0.508 1
Finance Uncertainty -0.312 0.714 1
Policy Uncertainty -0.477 0.352 0.381 1
VIX -0.327 0.649 0.852 0.456 1
Correlation of the IPO number and uncertainty measures, 1990M1-2015M12.
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2.2.4 Control Variables in Estimations
The results of Lowry (2003) and Ivanov and Lewis (2008) suggest that the
business condition, the investor and the consumer sentiments are the most
important drivers of IPO cycles9. Demand for capital should be higher when
business conditions are more promising. For example, firms have higher
demand for capital in order to make (new) investments in times of economic
growth, and if the financing costs from traditional bank loans are too high,
the firms may raise money from the public. Moreover, companies are more
likely to go public if investors are overoptimistic and willing to pay more
for those companies than they are worth. For example, Lee et al. (1991)
and Rajan and Servaes (1997) find that investor sentiment affect the IPO
activity over time. Additionally, Lowry and Schwert (2002) find a robust and
significant impact of past average initial returns on the IPO number. This
relationship is attributed to the information learned during the registration
period. In particular, they argue that more companies file IPOs following
periods of high initial returns because the high returns are linked to positive
information learned during the registration periods, indicating that compa-
nies can raise more money in an IPO than they had previously thought.
Accounting for the findings of the literature, I include the S&P 500 return,
the real GDP growth, the real industrial production growth, the term struc-
ture, the average initial return, the investor sentiment and the consumer
sentiment as control variables.
2.2.5 Econometric Specification
Given the stationarity of the IPO activity variables and the uncertainty mea-
sures, the following econometric model is estimated:
IPONumber t =β0+
k∑
i=1
αi IPONumber t−i+
k∑
i=1
βiUncertaintyt−i+
k∑
i=1
Xt−iδi+ut,
(2.1)
where IPONumber is the number of IPOs, Uncertainty denotes the
chosen uncertainty measure, Xt−i is a vector containing the aforementioned
control variables in t− i and δi is the corresponding coefficient vector.
9See Lowry (2003) for further discussions of how the business condition and investor
sentiment affect the number of firms going public.
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In order to guard against endogeneity issues, all explanatory variables
are lagged. I include the first three lags of all explanatory variables in the
benchmark specification. Three lags are a conservative choice, since a large
set of explanatory variables are included. Using monthly data, Lowry and
Schwert (2002) include three lags in a model with two explanatory variables,
while Ivanov and Lewis (2008) use up to two lags. In specifications with
two or one lag(s) the impact of the uncertainty measures are even more
significant10.
I present the long-run effects of each variable in the estimation results
section to ease interpretation11. For example, instead of presenting every
individual βˆi coefficient of the impact of uncertainty, I present the long-run
impact of uncertainty
∑3
i=1 βˆi and the corresponding standard error.
2.3 Uncertainty and IPO Activity
This section investigates the impact of economic uncertainty on IPO activity.
Throughout the remainder of the paper, Newey-West standard errors (Newey
and West, 1987) are used in order to account for possible heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation of the error term. I decided to use Macro Uncertainty as
the measure in the benchmark specification, since it quantifies the overall
macroeconomic uncertainty including uncertainty about financial and real
variables. Note that the initial return is missing in months when no IPOs
occur.
2.3.1 The Impact of Uncertainty on the Number of IPOs
Table 2.3 displays the impact of Macro Uncertainty on the number of IPOs
per month controlling for a large set of variables. Column (1) represents
the benchmark specification with Macro Uncertainty as uncertainty measure
and all control variables included, while the other columns present alterna-
tive specifications. Macro Uncertainty significantly impedes IPO number
throughout specifications and its impact magnitude also remains moderately
constant. A standard deviation increase in Macro Uncertainty lowers the
10The results are presented in the Appendix.
11Presenting estimations of a large set of explanatory variables with there corresponding
first three lags in one table may be confusing and impedes readability.
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number of IPOs on average by roughly four IPOs12. Moreover, specifications
with Macro Uncertainty always dominate corresponding specifications with-
out it in terms of explanatory power as suggested by the adjusted R, the
Akaike criterion and the Schwarz criterion.
Column (2) presents the estimation results for a specification without
Macro Uncertainty. Naturally, the adjusted R falls and the Akaike criterion
and the Schwarz criterion rise in this specification compared to column (1),
which indicates that Macro Uncertainty has a very high explanatory power.
In absence of Macro Uncertainty in column (2), the consumer sentiment gains
more explanatory power and its long-run coefficient and t-statistic increase,
so that its impact even becomes significant at the 10% significance level. This
result indicates a notable dependence between Macro Uncertainty and the
consumer sentiment and suggests that the explanatory power of consumer
sentiment is based on its considerable correlation with Macro Uncertainty;
the correlation is -0.44.
There is also a significant autoregressive component in the IPO number
itself. Alti (2005) provides a possible explanation for this finding. He argues
that the outcomes of pioneers’ IPOs contain private information on common
valuation factors of investors. This facilitates the pricing of subsequent is-
sues and attracts more firms to go public soon after. The level of initial
return also has a significant impact on the number of IPOs in the benchmark
specification. Lowry and Schwert (2002) attribute this relationship to the in-
formation learned during the registration period. Moreover, S&P 500 returns
show a significant impact on the IPO number, which reflects that the number
of IPOs increases if the financial market returns are higher. In summary, the
significant impact of the control variables are very much in line with Lowry
and Schwert (2002), Lowry (2003) and Ivanov and Lewis (2008).
To compare the impact of Macro Uncertainty with those of the other uncer-
tainty measures, Table 2.4 displays the impact of each uncertainty measure
on the number of IPOs in the benchmark specification with all control vari-
ables. Both financial market uncertainty indicators Finance Uncertainty
and the VIX have statistically significant adverse effects on the number of
IPOs. In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in Finance Uncer-
tainty and the VIX decrease the number of IPOs on average in the long-run
12(
∑3
i=1 βˆi,MacroUncertainty) ∗ σˆMacroUncertainty = −39.7 ∗ 0.088 ≈ 3.5, where
σˆMacroUncertainty is the standard deviation of Macro Uncertainty
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Table 2.3: Time Series Analysis of IPO Number
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Macro Uncertainty -39.7*** -41.1*** -44.4***
(12.83) (11.91) (12.90)
Control variables
IPO number .7730*** .7634*** .7774*** .8261*** .7797*** .8670***
(.0578) (.0624) (.0611) (.0613) (.0591) (.0542)
Underpricing .0676** .0394 .0734* .0509 .0794* .0657
(.0326) (.0496) (.0417) (.0472) (.0463) (.0488)
Term structure .0095 .3848 -.149 .5127 -.294 .4756
(.6255) (.6684) (.5426) (.6411) (.5850) (.5898)
SP 500 return 70.95* 85.78* 56.75* 101.0**
(39.88) (44.46) (31.71) (43.10)
Industrial production growth 88.70 443.9* 79.83 311.3
(246.1) (247.6) (241.1) (242.0)
GDP growth -400. -249. -400. -287.
(295.7) (281.4) (275.3) (282.3)
Consumer sentiment .0426 .1616* -.047 .0189
(.1002) (.0948) (.0830) (.0803)
Investor sentiment -3.31 -7.71 4.643 3.478
(8.119) (8.332) (6.545) (6.704)
N 257 257 257 257 279 279
Adjusted R .6647 .6192 .6699 .6427 .6616 .6371
Akaike Criterion 4.776 4.889 4.740 4.829 4.716 4.776
Schwarz Criterion 5.163 5.221 5.044 5.175 4.950 4.971
The table shows regressions in which the number of IPOs is the dependent variable. Robust
standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates signifi-
cance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. The sample is 1992M1-2015M12,
since the monthly GDP variables are not available prior to 1992. Regressions with a sample
1990M1-2015M12 without GDP growth deliver very similar results.
by roughly three and three, respectively13. This result is intuitive, since a
firm wants to raise as much public capital as possible in an IPO and high
financial market uncertainty is likely to depress investors’ willingness to
invest. The impact of Policy Uncertainty is, however, only significant at the
10% significance level and the estimation with Policy Uncertainty shows the
lowest explanatory power as indicated by the Adjusted R, Akaike criterion
and Schwarz criterion. In contrast, Macro Uncertainty contains the high-
est explanatory power which supports the view that firms take into account
the uncertainty from the real economy and the financial market when they
13Finance Uncertainty: (
∑3
i=1 βˆi,FinanceUncertainty)∗ σˆFinanceUncertainty = 15.01∗0.184 ≈
2.76. VIX: (
∑3
i=1 βˆi,V IX )∗ σˆV IX = 0.447∗7.641≈ 3.41.
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consider an IPO. The finding that Macro Uncertainty is the most important
uncertainty driver of IPO activity is further supported by Table 2.5, which
shows the estimation results of a specification in which all control variables
and all uncertainty measures are included. In this specification, only the
macroeconomic uncertainty measure displays a significant negative impact
on the IPO number.
Given the robust negative impact of uncertainty on the IPO number, a
persistent and high uncertainty shock could impede the IPO activity for a con-
siderable amount of periods. As high uncertainty disappears IPO-interested
firms, who valued the option to wait during periods of high uncertainty, start
to go public in the same time slot. The empirical results strongly support
the view that time-varying uncertainty is an important driver of IPO issue
cycles.
Table 2.4: The Individual Impact of Different Uncertainty Measures on IPO
Number
Uncertainty measure Impact on
IPO
number
N Adjusted
R
Akaike
Criterion
Schwarz
Criterion
Macro Uncertainty -39.7*** 257 .6647868 4.776425 5.163095
(12.838)
Finance Uncertainty -15.01*** 257 .6532018 4.810401 5.197072
(4.9390)
Policy Uncertainty -.0418* 257 .6419197 4.842416 5.229085
(.02294)
VIX -.4469*** 257 .6536126 4.809216 5.195886
(.14168)
The table shows the individual impact of the different uncertainty measures on the num-
ber of IPOs. The control variables in all estimations are the first three lags of S&P 500
return, GDP growth, industrial production growth, term structure, consumer sentiment
and investor sentiment. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance
at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level.
The sample is 1992M1-2015M12, since the monthly GDP variables are not available prior
to 1992. Regressions with a sample 1990M1-2015M12 without GDP growth deliver very
similar results.
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Table 2.5: The Simultaneous Impact of Different Uncertainty Measures on
IPO Number
Uncertainty measure Impact on IPO number
Macro Uncertainty -45.17**
(18.461)
Finance Uncertainty 1.9730
(11.082)
Policy Uncertainty -.0490
(.04182)
VIX -.1588
(.29643)
N 257
Adjusted R .66656
Akaike Criterion 4.8008
Schwarz Criterion 5.3118
The table shows the impact of the different uncertainty measures on the number of IPOs in a
model where all uncertainty measures and control variables are included . The control vari-
ables in all estimations are the first three lags of S&P 500 return, GDP growth, industrial
production growth, term structure, consumer sentiment and investor sentiment. Robust
standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates signifi-
cance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. The sample is 1992M1-2015M12,
since the monthly GDP variables are not available prior to 1992. Regressions with a sample
1990M1-2015M12 without GDP growth deliver very similar results.
2.3.2 The Impact of Uncertainty on the IPO Timing
In general, companies and/or underwriters have three ways to influence the
timing of an IPO. First, companies can choose the time to file the issue.
Second, the planned issue date can be changed. Third, they can withdraw
the issue. The strong negative relationship between uncertainty and the
subsequent number of IPOs indicate that firms time their IPOs in response
to the level of uncertainty. This subsection sheds light on the IPO timing of
firms and investigates the relation between uncertainty and the number of
IPO filings and the number of withdrawn IPOs.
Table 2.6 presents the estimation results for the number of filed and the
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number of withdrawn IPOs which are explained by different uncertainty
measures, controlling for the whole available set of control variables from
Equation (2.1). In other words, the IPONumber from Equation (2.1) is re-
placed by the number of filed and the number of withdrawn IPOs, respectively.
Here, the number of withdrawn IPOs are weighted by the sum of the number
of filed IPOs in the four previous months. This weighting approach is analo-
gous to Lowry and Schwert (2002) and scales the number of withdrawn IPOs
by the number of firms which could have possibly withdrawn their IPOs14.
However, no weighting or weighting with less than four months lead to the
same qualitative conclusion. I include the first two lags of all explanatory
variables, considering the smaller sample size and the recommendation of
the Schwarz criterion.
All uncertainty measures have significant negative impact on the IPO
timing, except for Policy Uncertainty. The insignificance of Policy Uncer-
tainty is expected, since Policy Uncertainty does not impact the IPO number
significantly in the analysis of the previous subsection. An increase in un-
certainty leads to a lower number of firms who file an IPO and raises the
number of withdrawn IPOs. The latter is particularly notable, since with-
drawing an IPO has numerous associated costs. First, withdrawing an IPO
may delay profitable investment due to financing shortage. This cost is par-
ticularly high for firms in nascent industries in which an early entrance
ensures first-mover advantages. A second cost of withdrawing an IPO is the
increased uncertainty about the firm valuation and an associated bad repu-
tation, which may hinder raising capital from the public securities markets
in the future. Lerner (1994) argues that even if the stated reason for the IPO
withdrawal is poor market conditions, the firm may still be lumped with other
companies whose offerings did not sell because of questionable accounting
practices or gross overpricing. In the same vein, Dunbar and Foerster (2008)
discover that only about 9% of withdrawn IPOs are able to return to have a
successful IPO and Lian and Wang (2009) find that the negative connotations
of the first-time withdrawal translate into lower valuations for second-time
IPOs. Therefore, high uncertainty seems to be of significant importance to
the firms, so that they withdraw their IPO in response to an uncertainty
shock despite the potential withdrawal costs.
14By using the scaled number of withdrawn IPOs in the regression, the magnitude of
impact cannot be easily calculated. However, the sign and significance of impact can still be
interpreted straightforwardly: A positive and significant coefficient of uncertainty indicates
that an increase in uncertainty leads to an increase in withdrawn IPOs on average.
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Table 2.6: The Impact of Different Uncertainty Measures on Number of Filed
IPOs and Number of Withdrawn IPOs
Uncertainty measure Impact on
Number of filed
IPOs
Impact on the
weighted
Number of
withdrawn IPOs
N
Macro Uncertainty -43.92*** .16705** 205
(15.498) (.06942)
Finance Uncertainty -11.25** .07937*** 205
(5.1210) (.02894)
Policy Uncertainty -.0093 .00006 205
(.02840) (.00012)
VIX -.4245** .00198** 205
(.16599) (.00093)
The table shows the individual impact of the different uncertainty measures on the number
of filed IPOs and number of withdrawn IPOs. The control variables in all estimations
are the first three lags of S&P 500 return, GDP growth, industrial production growth,
term structure, consumer sentiment and investor sentiment. Robust standard errors are
in brackets. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, ***
indicates significance at 1% level. The sample is 1997M1-2015M12.
2.3.3 Robustness Checks
The empirical results are qualitatively similar under numerous specifications.
Specifically, I use different lag specifications, include the NBER recession
dummy, include the business condition variables as leads, exclude some ex-
planatory variables, include an alternative investment sentiment measure15,
perform F-test on the joint impact of the lags of each explanatory variable
and alternate the maximum lag of autocorrelation in the error term. More-
over, estimations of corresponding autoregressive conditional count models
also deliver qualitatively comparable results. Estimation methods include
Poisson Maximum-Likelihood, Binomial Maximum-Likelihood, Exponential
15The alternative investment sentiment measure is computed by using the data on the
fraction of bullish investors minus the fraction of bearish investors from Investors Intelli-
gence (http://www.investorsintelligence.com/x/default.html).
2.4. Uncertainty and the IPO Market Conditions 28
Quasi-Maximum-Likelihood and Normal Quasi-Maximum-Likelihood. Last
but not least, I estimate the impact of Macro Uncertainty and Finance Uncer-
tainty with the sample 1981M1-2015M12 without monthly GDP as control
variable and obtain similar results16.
2.4 Uncertainty and the IPO Market Conditions
The finding that companies do not go public and even cancel their IPO is-
sue in response to high uncertainty suggests that uncertainty may have a
depressing effect on the (subsequent) IPO market condition. Therefore, this
section investigates the impact of uncertainty on the variables which are con-
sidered to be the key determinants of the IPO market conditions (e.g., Lowry,
2003; Ivanov and Lewis, 2008). Table 2.7 presents the correlations of Macro
Uncertainty with the IPO market condition variables. Macro Uncertainty is
negatively correlated with all market condition variables, while the market
condition variables are positively correlated with each other.
Table 2.7: Correlation of Macro Uncertainty and IPO Market Determinants
Macro
Uncer-
tainty
S&P
500
return
Ind.
Pro-
duc-
tion
growth
GDP
growth
Investor
senti-
ment
Consumer
senti-
ment
Macro Uncertainty 1
S&P 500 return -0.201 1
Ind. Production growth -0.422 -0.005 1
GDP growth -0.155 0.0939 0.216 1
Investor sentiment -0.263 0.442 0.170 0.154 1
Consumer sentiment -0.440 0.121 0.232 0.131 0.503 1
Correlation of Macro uncertainty and IPO market determinants for the period 1992M1-
2015M12.
16The estimation results for MacroUncertainty are presented in the Appendix.
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For each of the key variables (S&P 500 return, industrial production
growth, GDP growth, investor and consumer sentiment) the following regres-
sion equation is estimated:
yt =β0+
k∑
i=1
αi yt−i+
k∑
i=1
βiUncertaintyt−i+
k∑
i=1
Xt−iδi+ut, (2.2)
where y denotes a key variable, Uncertainty the uncertainty measure and
Xt−i the vector of control variables which contains the remaining key vari-
ables in t− i.
Table 2.8 summarizes the (long-run) impact of the different measures
of uncertainty on the IPO market determinants. In the third column the
impact of the uncertainty measures on the stock market return is presented.
Macro Uncertainty and Finance Uncertainty adversely affect the S&P 500
returns. This result is consistent with Segal et al. (2015), who find that uncer-
tainty, which is associated with negative innovation, decreases asset prices.
Industrial production is negatively affected by a rise in Macro Uncertainty,
Finance Uncertainty and the VIX. Bloom (2009) also finds that an increase
of the VIX leads to a drop in output. However, GDP growth and investor
sentiment are only significantly affected by Macro Uncertainty, while only
Policy Uncertainty has a significant impact on consumer sentiment.
The different uncertainty measures capture different aspects of economic
uncertainty and therefore have different impacts on the economic and senti-
ment variables. Among them Macro Uncertainty is the strongest predictor
of the IPO market determinants. In fact, Macro Uncertainty also performs
best in explaining IPO activity in section 2.3 in terms of significance and ex-
planatory power. These results strongly encourage the reasoning that firms
consider the uncertainty of real and financial variables when they plan to go
public.
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Table 2.8: The Impact of Different Uncertainty Measures on IPO Market
Determinants
Uncertainty Measure N S&P 500
return
Ind.
production
growth
GDP
growth
Investor
sentiment
Consumer
sentiment
Macro Uncertainty 285 -.113*** -.028*** -.009** -.150** -2.868
(.04061) (.01050) (.00457) (.07604) (2.4304)
Finance Uncertainty 285 -.033** -.007** -.0025 -.0163 .03928
(.01557) (.00310) (.00176) (.03391) (1.0204)
Policy Uncertainty 285 .00014 0.000 0.000 .00024 -.019**
(.00009) (.00002) (.00001) (.00024) (.00963)
VIX 285 .00011 -.00017** -.0000 .00030 .03649
(.00041) (.00008) (.00004) (.00077) (.02307)
The table shows the individual impact of the different uncertainty measures on the business
condition and sentiment variables. The control variables in all estimations are the lags
of S&P 500 return, GDP growth, industrial production growth, consumer sentiment and
investor sentiment. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%
level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. The sample
is 1992M1-2015M12.
2.5 Conclusion
Despite the large literature on IPO, we still have relatively little understand-
ing of why IPO hot and cold market phases exist. I provide an alternative
explanation for the occurrence of IPO issue cycles by relating these cycles to
time-varying economic uncertainty. Specifically, I empirically analyze the im-
pact of recently developed measures of economic uncertainty on the number
of IPOs, the number of newly filed IPOs and the number of withdrawn IPOs.
The estimations reveal a robust and negative impact of uncertainty on IPO
activity. For example, a one standard deviation increase in macroeconomic
uncertainty decreases the number of IPOs by roughly four. Both the reduc-
tion of the number of newly filed IPOs and the increase of the number of
withdrawn IPOs contribute to the lower IPO number. These findings suggest
the existence of the real options effect of waiting in the IPO market during
periods of high uncertainty. Moreover, I find that an increase in uncertainty
is negatively related to the (future) IPO market condition variables which
include the S&P 500 return, GDP growth, industrial production growth, in-
vestor optimism and consumer sentiment. The empirical results also identify
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macroeconomic uncertainty as the most crucial uncertainty driver of the
IPO market. Since high uncertainty shocks are relatively persistent and
take some time to fade away, they are likely to impede the IPO number for
a considerable amount of periods, and as uncertainty eventually dissolves,
IPO-interested firms start to go public in the same time slot. This mechanism
helps to widen the understanding of why IPO issue cycles exist. Neverthe-
less, it would be interesting to see if the response to uncertainty shocks has
sectoral variation. For example, firms in capital-intensive industries might
be more cautious than IT-firms, which are more willing to go public as soon
as possible to ensure the first-mover advantage in a fast-paced market.
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Appendix
Data Appendix
• IPO data
– Number of IPOs (IPO number): The number of IPOs per month are
provided by Jay Ritter (https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-
data/).
– Initial returns (Underpricing): The initial returns represent the
mean, across all IPOs each month, of the percentage difference
between a closing price within the first month after the IPO and
the offer price. A more complete description of the construction of
the data is in Ibbotson et al. (1994). The data is provided by Jay
Ritter (https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/).
– Number of filed IPOs: The number of filed IPOs per month are
fetched from the NASDAQ IPO database.
– Number of withdrawn IPOs: The number of withdrawn IPOs per
month are fetched from the NASDAQ IPO database.
• Uncertainty Measures
– Macro Uncertainty: The macroeconomic uncertainty by Jurado et
al. (2015) is collected from the website of Sydney Ludvigson
(http://www.sydneyludvigson.com/data-and-appendixes/)
– Finance Uncertainty: The financial uncertainty by Ludvigson et
al. (2016) is collected from the website of Sydney Ludvigson
(http://www.sydneyludvigson.com/data-and-appendixes/)
– Policy Uncertainty: The economic policy uncertainty by Baker et
al. (2016) is collected from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/
– VIX: The VIX is collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St.Louis (https://fred.stlouisfed.org).
• Other variables
– The S&P 500, the industrial production index and the consumer
confidence are collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis
(https://fred.stlouisfed.org).
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– Monthly GDP: Monthly GDP is collected from the Macroeconomic
Advisers database (http://www.macroadvisers.com/).
– Term spread: Term spread is collected from the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York.
– Investor sentiment: I follow Han (2008) and proxy investor sen-
timent as the fraction of bullish investors minus the fraction of
bearish investors. I use the database from the American Asso-
ciation of Individual Investors (http://www.aaii.com/) to calculate
the investor sentiment for the benchmark estimation. As a ro-
bustness check, I use the database from Investors Intelligence
(http://www.investorsintelligence.com/x/default.html) to compute
the investor sentiment. The overall results are very similar.
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Supportive Tables
Table 2.9: Time Series Analysis of IPO Number with Two Lags
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Macro Uncertainty -39.5*** -43.1*** -40.7***
(11.51) (11.21) (11.98)
Control variables
IPO number .7182*** .7721*** .7295*** .7721*** .7230*** .8002***
(.0564) (.0598) (.0588) (.0598) (.0592) (.0556)
Underpricing .0662** .0485 .0807* .0485 .0730 .0592
(.0334) (.0503) (.0478) (.0503) (.0497) (.0507)
Term structure -.004 .6909 -.364 .6909 -.134 .6902
(.5595) (.6268) (.5419) (.6268) (.5941) (.5994)
SP 500 return 24.64 48.76 14.69 48.76
(24.83) (30.01) (25.50) (30.01)
Industrial production growth -28.7 157.8 -42.4 157.8
(177.2) (180.3) (178.4) (180.3)
GDP growth -315. -246 -299. -246
(202.4) (199.7) (192.1) (199.7)
Consumer sentiment .0933 .1761** .0271 .0995
(.0851) (.0859) (.0807) (.0786)
Investor sentiment -2.56 -6.87 .7796 -1.01
(6.935) (7.362) (5.713) (5.838)
N 264 264 264 264 287 287
Adjusted R .6347 .6206 .6386 .6206 .6343 .6173
Akaike Criterion 4.821 4.852 4.796 4.852 4.763 4.802
Schwarz Criterion 5.078 5.082 4.999 5.082 4.916 4.929
The table shows regressions in which the number of IPOs is the dependent variable. The first
two lags of all explanatory variables are included in the estimation. Robust standard errors
are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level,
*** indicates significance at 1% level. The sample is 1992M1-2015M12, since the monthly
GDP variables are not available prior to 1992. Regressions with a sample 1990M1-2015M12
without GDP growth deliver very similar results.
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Table 2.10: Time Series Analysis of IPO Number with One Lag
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Macro Uncertainty -39.1*** -41.3*** -36.2***
(9.422) (8.650) (8.856)
Control variables
IPO number .6915*** .7511*** .6976*** .7511*** .6849*** .7513***
(.0490) (.0520) (.0501) (.0520) (.0520) (.0501)
Underpricing .0813** .0708* .0878** .0708* .0812** .0726*
(.0339) (.0388) (.0408) (.0388) (.0409) (.0404)
Term structure .2062 .7379 .0032 .7379 .1221 .6570
(.5198) (.5903) (.4869) (.5903) (.5347) (.5589)
SP 500 return -4.86 8.706 -5.96 8.706
(20.54) (21.52) (19.62) (21.52)
Industrial production growth -99.9 -17.0 -99.8 -17.0
(125.0) (120.8) (118.3) (120.8)
GDP growth -208. -210.* -205. -210.*
(129.3) (123.3) (121.4) (123.3)
Consumer sentiment .0514 .1396* .0229 .0986
(.0762) (.0758) (.0713) (.0687)
Investor sentiment -.539 -2.29 1.454 .5530
(5.600) (6.055) (4.530) (4.607)
N 275 275 275 275 299 299
Adjusted R .6352 .6186 .6373 .6186 .6361 .6213
Akaike Criterion 4.796 4.837 4.783 4.837 4.735 4.772
Schwarz Criterion 4.927 4.955 4.888 4.955 4.810 4.834
The table shows regressions in which the number of IPOs is the dependent variable. The
first lag of all explanatory variables are included in the estimation. Robust standard errors
are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level,
*** indicates significance at 1% level. The sample is 1992M1-2015M12, since the monthly
GDP variables are not available prior to 1992. Regressions with a sample 1990M1-2015M12
without GDP growth deliver very similar results.
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Table 2.11: Time Series Analysis of IPO Number without Monthly GDP
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Macro Uncertainty -39.3*** -39.9*** -44.4***
(12.88) (12.31) (12.90)
Control variables
IPO number .7873*** .7800*** .7852*** .8449*** .7797*** .8670***
(.0549) (.0583) (.0598) (.0564) (.0591) (.0542)
Underpricing .0720** .0466 .0735* .0567 .0794* .0657
(.0322) (.0510) (.0423) (.0477) (.0463) (.0488)
Term structure .0577 .5691 .0124 .6412 -.294 .4756
(.5874) (.6398) (.5215) (.6113) (.5850) (.5898)
SP 500 return 91.97** 112.4*** 81.08*** 126.5***
(37.27) (40.92) (28.93) (39.93)
Industrial production growth -133. 195.1 -157. 85.24
(207.2) (213.8) (212.6) (206.6)
Consumer sentiment .0056 .1247 -.047 .0189
(.0886) (.0873) (.0830) (.0803)
Investor sentiment -1.44 -6.12 4.643 3.478
(7.487) (7.631) (6.545) (6.704)
N 277 277 277 277 279 279
Adjusted R .6603 .6144 .6650 .6410 .6616 .6371
Akaike Criterion 4.749 4.863 4.716 4.795 4.716 4.776
Schwarz Criterion 5.076 5.138 4.964 5.082 4.950 4.971
The table shows regressions in which the number of IPOs is the dependent variable. Robust
standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates signifi-
cance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. The sample is 1990M1-2015M12.
2.5. Conclusion 37
Table 2.12: Time Series Analysis of IPO Number without GDP 1980M1-
2015M12
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Macro Uncertainty -20.2** -16.4*** -24.6***
(7.991) (5.983) (7.684)
Control variables
IPO number .7939*** .7546*** .8045*** .8091*** .8075*** .8432***
(.0408) (.0492) (.0456) (.0478) (.0452) (.046)
Underpricing .0925*** .0735* .0799** .0797** .1106*** .0933**
(.0293) (.0418) (.0385) (.0394) (.0394) (.0398)
Term structure -.157 .2941 -.208 .2984 -.318 .3585
(.3655) (.3843) (.3855) (.3724) (.4007) (.3740)
SP 500 return 130.0*** 132.2*** 102.5*** 140.0***
(31.69) (34.34) (24.83) (33.53)
Industrial production growth 46.48 241.8* 16.63 171.8
(144.8) (137.5) (147.1) (133.9)
Consumer sentiment -.031 .0605 -.055 .0264
(.0505) (.0432) (.0538) (.0411)
Investor sentiment -.062** -.077** -.010 -.002
(.0288) (.0322) (.0297) (.0281)
N 393 393 393 393 395 395
Adjusted R .6631 .6326 .6647 .6508 .6547 .6399
Akaike Criterion 4.597 4.675 4.578 4.626 4.606 4.641
Schwarz Criterion 4.850 4.887 4.770 4.849 4.787 4.792
The table shows regressions in which the number of IPOs is the dependent variable. Robust
standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates signifi-
cance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. The sample is 1980-2015M12. The
investor sentiment is calculated from the Investors Intelligence database.
CHAPTER 3
Real Options Effect of Uncertainty and Labor
Demand Shocks on the Housing Market
This chapter is joint work with Gabriel Lee and Johannes Strobel.
Abstract: This paper documents that macroeconomic uncertainty affects
the housing market in two significant ways. First, uncertainty shocks ad-
versely affect housing prices but not the quantities that are traded. Con-
trolling for a broad set of variables in fixed-effects regressions, we find that
uncertainty shocks reduce housing prices and median sales prices in the
amount of 1.4% and 1.8%, respectively, but the effect is not statistically sig-
nificant for the percentage changes of all homes sold. Second, when both
uncertainty and local demand shocks are introduced, the effects of uncer-
tainty on the housing market dominate that of local labor demand shocks on
housing prices, median sell prices, the share of houses selling for loss, and
transactions. The aforementioned effects are largest for the states that ex-
hibit relatively high housing price volatilities, suggesting real options effects
in the housing market during the times of high uncertainty.
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3.1 Introduction
Three well documented features of the recent Great Recession are the decline
in housing prices, the increase in unemployment rate, and the increase in the
presence of uncertainty in the United States. Figure 3.1 shows the correla-
tion between the U.S. housing price growth rate and some of the uncertainty
measures in the recent literature over the period from 1990 to 2014 with
the highlighted recession periods: a clear negative correlation between the
housing price growth rate and the shown uncertainty measures.1
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Figure 3.1: House Price Growth Rates and Uncertainty Prox-
ies
Time series of the house price growth rates and the four uncertainty mea-
sures, 1990M1-2014M12. The shaded areas denote the periods of reces-
sion according to the NBER definition.
1We use four different uncertainty measures in our analysis: the Macro Uncertainty
by Jurado et al. (2015), the VIX by Bloom (2009), the Policy Uncertainty by Baker et al.
(2016), and our measure, which is analogous to Baker et al. (2016) but on a state level (State
Uncertainty). Correlations between these uncertainty measure over these periods range
between 0.25 and 0.63.
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Figure 3.2: Unemployment Rate and Labor Demand Shocks
Time series of the unemployment rate and Bartik index which captures
labor demand shocks, 1990M1-2014M12. The shaded areas denote the
periods of recession according to the NBER definition.
Figure 3.2 also shows a strong negative correlation between the monthly
U.S. unemployment rate and the Bartik index that proxies the U.S. labor
demand shocks from 1990M1 to 2014M12.
There are numerous recent papers that deal with the effects of uncer-
tainty and labor demand shocks on aggregate economy as well as housing
and labor markets separately. For example, Christiano et al. (2014) show
that uncertainty adversely impacts the economy, while Dorofeenko et al.
(2014) show uncertainty shock can explain the U.S. housing price volatil-
ities. For the labor demand shock on housing and labor markets, Edlund
et al. (2015) examine the impact of labor demand shocks, using the Bartik
index, on housing prices, and Shoag and Veuger (2014) empirically show that
uncertainty may amplify labor demand shocks. This paper, however, exam-
ines the simultaneous effects of uncertainty and local labor demand shocks
on the U.S. housing market. We specifically look at the average housing
prices, the median selling prices, the share of houses selling for loss and
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transactions (houses sold). More precisely, we seek to answer (i) does uncer-
tainty directly affect the housing market, (ii) if a local labor demand shock
occurs in a period of high uncertainty, is the impact different compared to
a period of low uncertainty and (iii) how robust are the outcomes given the
choice of the uncertainty proxy and the threshold level defining a period of
high uncertainty?
First, controlling for a broad set of variables, we find that uncertainty
shocks directly affect prices but not quantities. The median sell price as well
as the housing price decrease on average by 1.80% and 1.42%, respectively.
Second, a positive local labor demand shock significantly increases median
sell prices, house prices and transactions and decreases the share of houses
selling for loss. If a labor demand shock occurs during a period of high un-
certainty, however, then it essentially affects neither prices nor quantities:
Home sellers and -buyers do not trade at the price and wait out in selling and
buying until the uncertainty periods are over. This observation is consistent
with the occurrence of a real options effect akin to the irreversibility of an
investment described by Pindyck (1991, p.1117): "There will be a value to
waiting (i.e., an opportunity cost to investing today rather than waiting for
information to arrive) whenever the investment is irreversible and the net
payoff from the investment evolves stochastically over time". For instance,
Bloom et al. (2007) show that because of real options effects, firms’ respon-
siveness to demand shocks is generally lower in periods of high uncertainty.
Capozza and Helsley (1990) are the first to examine the impact of uncertainty
on land values and development decisions in a spatial context. Geltner et
al. (1996) show that alternative uses lead to a delay in development, while
Childs et al. (1996) demonstrate that the ability to mix uses and to redevelop
affects the timing of land development. Holland et al. (2000), Childs et al.
(2002), Clapp et al. (2013), Bulan et al. (2009), and Cunningham (2006, 2007)
empirically show that real options play an important role for house prices
dynamics, housing investment and land prices.
Analogous to the irreversible investment literature, we find the response
of housing market variables to labor demand shocks to be much lower in
times of high uncertainty, suggesting real options effects (option to "wait
and see") in the housing market during times of high uncertainty. More
specifically, we show that following an adverse shock in labor demand of one
standard deviation, the real option value ("wait and see" effect) in the hous-
ing price amounts to 0.19%, and the effect increases to 0.32% for the states
(locations) that exhibit relatively high housing price volatilities. Further-
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more, we find that following an adverse labor demand shock, not only the
share of houses selling for loss significantly decreases in times of high uncer-
tainty when compared to normal times, but also the number of homes sold
remains almost constant.2 To show that the real option value increases with
higher uncertainty, we sort the fifty one states into three equal-sized groups,
according to the unconditional housing price volatility in each state. In doing
so, we find that while the impact of local labor demand shocks is largest for
the group with the highest housing price volatility, uncertainty completely
offsets the labor demand shock - as opposed to the other two groups, where
we find no significant impact of uncertainty.
Our results, thus, indicate uncertainty shocks affect housing price move-
ments both directly and indirectly. On the one hand, uncertainty adversely
affects housing prices. On the other hand, it alters the impact of shocks
during uncertain times, with this latter effect consistent with the presence
of real option effects arising in a period of high uncertainty in the housing
market.3 One important implication of our results, analogous to Bloom et al.
(2007), is that in order for policy measures to work properly, highest priority
should be given to the reduction of uncertainty.4
We address real option issues in housing markets using monthly U.S.
state-level data from 1990 to 2014. We construct binary uncertainty dum-
mies to indicate the periods of high uncertainty, as in Bloom (2009) and a
variation of the Bartik index proposed by Bartik (1991) as local labor demand
shocks to quantify the impact of these two shocks on the housing market. Our
approach thus corresponds to models using two-state Markov-switching pro-
cesses, where regime changes can be documented by an uncertainty index
crossing various threshold values, which are based on the percentiles of the
distribution of the uncertainty proxy. Our approach in defining the threshold
values differs from the one used in, for example, Bloom (2009), who defines
periods of uncertainty as the proxy when 1.65 or more standard deviations
above the mean. We use the macroeconomic uncertainty measure by Jurado
2We show the robustness of the above results to different threshold values that are ranged
from 80th, 85th, 90th and 95th percentile of an uncertainty proxy.
3See also Aastveit et al. (2013), in which structural Vector Autoregressions are used to
document wait-and-see effects in monetary policy during periods of high uncertainty. See
also Bloom (2014) for further discussion and sectors where real option effects arise.
4Especially in light of the results of Stroebel and Vavra (2014), who show that there is
a causal relation between changes in housing prices and changes in retails prices and thus
consumption.
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et al. (2015) as our benchmark measure but we also include other uncer-
tainty measures such as the economic policy uncertainty proxy by Baker et
al. (2016), the VIX which is also used by Bloom (2009), and the state-level
uncertainty similar to Baker et al. (2016) to analyze the state level housing
markets.
3.2 Data, Bartik Index and Uncertainty Mea-
sures
In the following section, we describe the data as well as the construction of
the Bartik index and various uncertainty measures used in our empirical
analysis.
3.2.1 Data
We use monthly state-level data from 1990M1 to 2014M12; the data and
sources are described in detail in the Appendix. Zillow Real Estate Research
data and Freddie Mac provide information on various aspects of the housing
market, such as the housing price, median sales price, the share of houses
sold for loss and turnover. The housing price is the inflation adjusted housing
price index from Freddie Mac; the median sales price is defined as the median
of the selling price for all homes sold in a given state. The share of houses
sold for loss is defined as the percentage of homes in an area that sold for
a price lower than the previous sale price and turnover is defined as the
percentage of all homes in a given area that are sold in the past 12 months.
These housing variables constitute the vector of dependent variables.
3.2.2 Bartik Index
The Bartik index is a measure of the predicted change in demand for employ-
ment in a state given by the interaction between a state’s initial industry
mix and national changes in industry employment. The index compares
the preexisting differences in the sectoral composition of employment across
states with the broad changes in national employment, especially changes
subject to a trend, asymmetrically impact states. In this paper, we follow
Saks (2008) to construct the Bartik index. We use the index of Saks (2008)
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due to its transparency and straightforward interpretation:
bartikit =
∑
j
e i jt−1
e it−1
( e˜ i jt− e˜ i jt−1
e˜ i jt−1
− e t− e t−1
e t−1
)
(3.1)
where i=state, j=industry, t=month; e˜ i jt = national industry employment
outside of state i; e it= state employment =
∑
j
e i jt; e t= national employment
=
∑
i
e it; e i jt = employment in state i in industry j.
The first fraction reflects the share of industry j employment relative to the
total employment in state i in t−1, the second fraction is the growth rate
of industry j outside of state i and the third fraction reflects the change
in national employment. Thus, the term in brackets reflects the change in
industry j employment (outside state i) relative to changes in national em-
ployment. This term is weighted by the “importance” of industry j in state
i in t−1. We use j=4 sectors across i=51 states in this analysis: manufac-
turing, private services, public services and construction and logging. We
use the time series of the Bartik index aggregated across states as displayed
in Figure 3.2. The results remain unchanged if we exclude the construction
sector from the Bartik index.
3.2.3 Uncertainty Measures
Various uncertainty proxies have been proposed in the recent literature. As
shown in Figure 3.1, depending on the preferred proxy, the number of un-
certainty shocks may differ considerably, although it is also possible that
different proxies capture different aspects of uncertainty. We use the Macro
Uncertainty measure, due to Jurado et al. (2015), for our baseline results be-
cause it is, by construction, uncorrelated with any single time series. Macro
Uncertainty captures the predictability of the overall macroeconomic envi-
ronment; the less predictable the macroeconomic variables, the higher the
macroeconomic uncertainty. We decided to use the one-month-ahead mea-
sure, since the data are at a monthly frequency. See section 1.2 for a more
detailed description of the data.
We also use three uncertainty measures including Policy Uncertainty,
the VIX and State Uncertainty for the robustness check on our empirical
analysis. The State Uncertainty indicator is constructed as the monthly num-
ber of news-paper articles in a state containing either one of the keywords
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“economic uncertainty”, “economy uncertain” or “economy uncertainty” from
2000M1 until 2014M125. We also scale the State Uncertainty indicator by the
number of newspapers and normalize it by dividing by the standard deviation
in each state in a robustness check of the estimation results. In creating this
index, we follow Baker et al. (2016). As can be seen in Figure 3.1, there are
considerable differences in fluctuations, and thus in the periods classified as
uncertain.6 A definition of the threshold value is needed in order to identify
the number of uncertainty periods and to construct binary uncertainty se-
ries. Bloom (2009) suggests using “1.65 standard deviations above the mean,
selected as the 5% one-tailed significance level treating each month as an
independent observation”. However, specifying the threshold in this manner
does not leave any adjustment opportunity if the assumption of Normality
and independently and identically distributed uncertainty shocks does not
hold.7 Table 3.1 shows the number of months defined as "uncertain" by vari-
ous uncertain proxies. For example, using the Macro Uncertainty by Jurado
et al. (2015), when α equals 5% then the Normal Distributional assumption
leads to seventy-six uncertain periods instead of fifty-eight periods when one
uses the corresponding percentiles of the actual distribution. Consequently,
we use the corresponding percentiles at various levels in our analysis to
show the robustness of empirical results as well as to avoid the Normal i.i.d.
assumption. Figure 3.3 shows the time periods defined as uncertain using
different uncertainty proxies. The right-lower panel also displays the state
uncertainty proxy after aggregating, although there is substantial variation
across states. Note, however, the similarities between the economic policy
uncertainty indicator and our State Uncertainty proxy.
5The data on state-level news-paper articles are collected from www.newslibrary.com.
6See Strobel (2015) for further elaboration on the reasons for this observation.
7We tested for the normality of the uncertainty proxies using the Jarque-Bera test, and
the null of normality was rejected for each proxy.
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Table 3.1: Number of Months Defined as Uncertain.
20 % 15% 10% 5%
1−α α 1−α α 1−α α 1−α α
Percentile (P) Normal (N) P N P N P N
Macro Uncertainty 124 104 103 96 80 86 58 76
Policy Uncertainty 192 188 174 175 156 162 138 148
State Uncertainty 36 27 27 21 18 18 9 13
VIX 240 222 225 217 210 206 195 197
Note: Number of months defined as uncertain from 1960:1 - 2011:12 for
Macro Uncertainty, 1985:1 - 2015:2 for Policy Uncertainty, 2000:1 -2014:12
for State Uncertainty and 1990:1 - 2015:2 for the VIX; the α one-tailed signif-
icance level is from the Normal Distribution and the series assume to follow
i.i.d. as in Bloom (2009).
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Figure 3.3: Periods of High Uncertainty
Time series of the uncerainty measures and the corresponding periods
whichs are defined as highly uncertain, 1990M1-2014M12. The shaded
areas denote the periods in which the uncertainty measures exceed their
corresponding 80-th, 85-th, 90-th and 95-th percentile, respectively. Ex-
ceeding, for example, the 80-th percentile means that the respective un-
certainty measure is greater than 80% of its values in the sample.
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3.3 Estimation Methodology and Results
3.3.1 Estimation Methodology
As we seek to investigate the role of uncertainty in the housing market, we
interact uncertainty and labor demand shocks. To address various economet-
ric issues in our emprical setup, we first use the standard errors developed in
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) to account for spatial dependence, heterogeneity
and autocorrelation. To guard against feedback effects, we lag the explana-
tory variables. Moreover, by construction, our uncertainty measure are ex-
ogenous. For example, our benchmark Macro Uncertainty measure, as stated
above, consists of purely unforecastable components. Consequently, by the
definition and construction of the Macro Uncertainty, there should not be any
underlying simultaneity between housing market variables and the Macro
Uncertainty. Moreover, the VIX, which captures the expected volatility of the
S&P 500 index, is also unlikely to be strongly influenced by housing prices.
And, although, Policy Uncertainty and the State Uncertainty measure might
be affected in the same period news, it seems rather unlikely that housing
prices today affect yesterday’s news coverage. Additionally, we include a rich
set of controls to avoid an omitted variable bias.8 As for the Bartik index, the
local labor demand shocks bartikit are constructed to be exogenous given a
constant labor supply. Binary uncertainty indicators are coded to be one if
uncertainty is above a threshold value and zero otherwise.
Our empirical model is given by:
yit = xit−τ→γ +1unc,it−τ
→
β1t−τ+bartikit−τ
→
β2t−τ+1unc,it−τ×bartikit−τ
→
β3t−τ+αi+uit
(3.2)
where xit−τ is a vector containing up to τ lags of the control variables, γ is the
corresponding parameter vector, αi is the state specific intercept, 1unc,it−τ
and bartikit−τ are (1×τ) vectors of lagged uncertainty indicators and labor
demand shocks, respectively, and β jt−τ, j = 1,2,3 are the corresponding (τ×1)
parameter vectors. An element of β jt−τ reflects the impact of the respective
lag, while the sum of the elements gives the long-run impact. We experi-
mented with different lag-lengths and use τ= 6 lags as baseline specification,
8In particular, due to the long time dimension, we cannot use time fixed-effects in this
setting. Therefore, we include a host of controls in order to capture variation in the economic
environment. The complete set of control variables used for our empirical analysis is shown
in the Appendix.
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but the results are not sensitive to the number of lags as long as we use more
than two and less than seven. The coefficients of main interest are β1t−τ,
β2t−τ and β3t−τ. β1t−τ reflects the impact of a regime-change from low to high
uncertainty, β2t−τ reflects the impact of a local labor demand shock on the
housing market and β3t−τ states the (change in the) effect of a local labor
demand shock in a period of high uncertainty. In other words, β3t−τ is a mea-
sure for the change in the responsiveness of the housing market variables
due to high uncertainty. If β3t−τ is significantly different from zero and its
sign is different (same) from β2t−τ, then uncertainty diminishes (amplifies)
the impact of the local labor demand shock.
For example, in an uncertain period, even though the impact of an ad-
verse labor demand shock on the housing price is negative, home sellers will
most likely not sell at the lower prices as this would unnecessarily reduce
the return of the most important asset of most households. The underlying
assumption is that the investment opportunity (selling or buying the house)
is irreversible once exercised but available until then. In that sense, β3t−τ
proxies the real option value by capturing the change in the equilibrium
housing price or the median selling price that does not materialize following
a labor demand shock because of uncertainty.
3.3.2 Baseline Results
Our empirical objectives are to show (i) the quantitative effect of uncertainty
on the housing market, (ii) the change in the impact of local labor demand
shocks on the housing market if they occur during periods of uncertainty
and (iii) the sensitivity of the results with respect to varying threshold levels
and different uncertainty proxies. Table 3.2 shows occurrence of the dimin-
ished responsiveness due to uncertainty in our benchmark regression results,
based on the Macro Uncertainty measure, 1macro. The estimated
→
β j repre-
sent the long-run effect, i.e. the sum of the estimated elements of
→
β jt−τ.9
The second column of Table 3.2 shows the long-run impact,
→
β1, of uncer-
tainty on housing prices, median sell prices, the percentage loss of houses
selling and turnover; we control for the federal funds rate, housing starts
proxying for residential investment, income, industrial production, inflation,
9We use 95th percentile as our cut off point for the Macro Uncertainty measure.
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Table 3.2: Long-run Effects of Uncertainty, Bartik and Interaction Term
Dependent Variable 1macro Bartik Bartik*1macro Obs.
∆log(median sales price) -.0180** 32.63*** -31.68*** 6,539
(.00752) (10.679) (11.765)
∆log(house price) -.0142*** 10.93*** -14.35*** 13,158
(.00344) (3.8337) (4.3892)
∆% selling for loss .52575 -1133.00** 994.94** 5,904
(.37032) (492.26) (485.88)
∆turnover -.0036 147.26** -202.00** 6,011
(.05451) (66.317) (79.781)
Note: Sample period from 1990 onwards. The long-run effects of uncertainty (95th percentile
threshold), bartik and interaction term are presented with corresponding standard errors
in brackets. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, ***
indicates significance at 1% level.
population, and the S&P 500 and the unemployment rate.10 As opposed to
the predictions by Dorofeenko et al. (2014)11, we find that uncertainty ad-
versely affects the median sell prices and house prices on average by 1.80%
and 1.42%, respectively. In other words, Dorofeenko et al. (2014) results are
driven by the supply side, which our empirical results do not necessarily sup-
port. Moreover, we find uncertainty impacts neither turnover nor the share
of houses selling for loss directly. The intuition for this findings is that in
the long-run uncertainty decreases, on average, buyers’ willingness to pay.
Because sellers do not want to postpone selling indefinitely, they reduce the
asking price, which in turn reduces the equilibrium housing price.
For the robustness check on the uncertainty measures, we also show the
results for different threshold values (i.e. percentile cutoffs) as shown in
10We include these variables to capture the demand and supply factors that influence the
local housing market and the information available to market participants (i.e. robustness
checks for endogeneity and omitted variables). We also check for various Granger causality
test. We conduct other variety of robustness checks described in the next subsection.
11Dorofeenko et al. (2014) show that an increase in their measure of uncertainty has an
increasing effect on house prices due to the default premium on the housing developers:
There is a markup on housing prices due to the bankruptcy possibility that is caused by
uncertainty.
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Figure 3.4: The Impact of Macro Uncertainty
The graph illustrates the long-run impact of Macro Uncertainty on the
house price and the median sold price for the different threshold values
which are used to identify periods of high uncertainty.
Figure 3.4. Regardless of the threshold value, the sign and the significance
of the estimated
→
β1 for the log house price and log median sales price do not
change.12
The column three of Table 3.2 shows the long-run impact of labor demand
shocks, proxied by bartik. The impact is highly significant for all dependent
variables, even after controlling for state-level unemployment. For example,
one standard deviation increase in the local labor demand shock (i.e., the
bartik, which is defined as change in state-level employment relative to a
change in national employment), increases house prices, median sell prices
and transactions on average by .14%, .43% and 1.92%-points, respectively
and decreases the share of houses selling for loss by 14.77%-points. Due to
linearity, the signs reverse in the case of adverse labor demand shocks - as
12All of the coefficients are significant at a 1% significance level, except for one which is
significant at the 5% level.
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observed in most states during the Great Recession period.13
The above results indicate that the uncertainty and labor demand shocks
affect the housing market variables in opposite direction. To determine the
quantitative effects of these two shocks on the housing variables, we intro-
duce an interaction term,
→
β3: the results are shown in the fourth column
of Table 3.2. When the labor demand shock occurs during a period of high
uncertainty then, for almost every dependent variable and threshold level,
the effect of uncertainty shock dominates the labor demand shock: a clear
sign change from the estimated
→
β2 being positive to the estimated
→
β3 being
negative.
As discussed above,
→
β3 quantifies the homeowners’ diminished response
("wait and see effect") following a labor demand shock: 0.19% (0.013%×14.35)
of the house price and 0.41% (0.013%×31.68) of the median sell price. For the
expositional purpose of the interaction term, Figure 3.5 shows the effects of
a labor demand shock with - and without uncertainty shock (using our bench-
mark Macro Uncertainty shock). All dots in the graphs are significant at
the 10% significance level. The blue line (Bartik Normal Times) summarizes
the long-run impact of labor demand shocks,
→
β2, on the various dependent
variables, while the red line (Bartik High Uncertainty) represents the impact
of labor demand shocks in uncertainty times, i.e.
→
β2+
→
β3. Figure 3.5 clearly
shows that when uncertain periods occur then the effect of the labor demand
shock is greatly muted. These dominating uncertainty shock effects suggest
the presence of real options effects in housing market. This result is in line
with the findings of Quintin and Davis (2014), who find that uncertainty
about housing prices kept the default rate low relative to a situation without
uncertainty. Figure 3.6 is analogous to Figure 3.5, but with State Uncertainty
shock: the results are not overturned.
13We report the impact of a standard deviation increase due to the scale of the bartik.
Mean local labor demand decreases from 1990 until 2014 by 0.004%-points, while one stan-
dard deviation corresponds to 0.013%-points: For example, for the log house price, we report
an increase of 0.14% as 0.013×10.93, while the real option value is calculated similarly as
0.013 ×14.35= 0.19%, where
→
β3 = 14.35.
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Figure 3.5: The Impact of Bartik and Macro Uncertainty
The graph illustrates the long-run impact of the Bartik index in periods of
low and high Macro Uncertainty for the different threshold values which
are used to identify periods of high uncertainty.
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Figure 3.6: The Impact of Bartik and State Uncertainty
The graph illustrates the long-run impact of the Bartik index in periods
of low and high State Uncertainty for the different threshold values which
are used to identify periods of high uncertainty.
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Table 3.3: Long-run Effects of Uncertainty, Bartik and Interaction Term:
Other Uncertainty Measures
Dep. Variable 1macro Bartik (B) B*1macro 1State B B*1State 1vix B B*1vix
∆log(med sell price) -.0180** 32.627*** -31.68*** -.0033 30.296*** -24.84** -.0058 42.316*** -44.64***
(.00752) (10.679) (11.765) (.00405) (11.723) (12.330) (.00930) (12.339) (16.513)
∆log(house price) -.0142*** 10.925*** -14.35*** -.0048*** 15.315*** -17.63*** .00191 12.625*** -11.40
(.00344) (3.8337) (4.3892) (.00144) (4.2199) (4.4932) (.00482) (4.2128) (7.1745)
∆% selling for loss .52575 -1133.** 994.94** .48216** -1229.** 1038.6* .48033 -1584.0*** 1517.5**
(.37032) (492.26) (485.88) (.23001) (479.62) (558.01) (.54268) (524.17) (699.86)
∆turnover -.0036 147.26** -202.0** -.0577*** 81.225* -152.3*** .05951* 95.007* -102.4
(.05451) (66.317) (79.781) (.02065) (43.376) (57.010) (.03517) (54.964) (98.765)
Note: As the months defined as high uncertainty differ across the proxies, the variation used
to identify
→
β1t−τand
→
β3t−τ, the coefficients of uncertainty and the interaction term, differs as
well. The long-run effects of uncertainty (95th percentile threshold), bartik and interaction
term are presented with corresponding standard errors in brackets. * indicates significance
at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level.
Overall, we find that the results in Bloom et al. (2007) for the firm level
carry over to the housing market: uncertainty greatly diminishes the re-
sponsiveness of housing market variables to labor demand shocks. We note,
however, our results are somewhat sensitive to the choice of the uncertainty
proxy, which can be seen in Table 3.3. For example, the impact of uncertainty
shocks on the growth rates of housing prices, median sell prices is robust
although slightly differs quantitatively.
One exception is when the VIX is used to define periods of high uncer-
tainty. This result is to be expected as the different uncertainty proxies
indicate different periods of high uncertainty. Although we do not show the
results with the Policy Uncertainty shock in Table 3.3, the real options ef-
fects (
→
β3) from the Policy Uncertainty are not as strongly associated if high
threshold values (90th or 95th percentile) are used. The reason might be that
when the 95th percentile threshold, the Policy Uncertainty proxy represents
only the periods that are associated with the post 2011 period (this includles
the period during the European Debt crisis). And hence, there is not enough
sample size to test for the interaction terms. However, if the 85th percentile
is taken as threshold value, the interaction effects become significant again,
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as more periods, especially the months before 2010, are classified as periods
of high uncertainty.
3.3.3 Grouping States by Housing Price Volatility
To analyze whether the real option effect varies by regions, we sort the fifty
one U.S. states into three groups according to the unconditional housing
price volatility in each state over time, and we estimate our model (3.2) for
each one of the groups. The three groups are equal size and we refer to them
as low, medium and high: Our hypothesis is to test empirically whether the
change in the responsiveness of housing market variables is larger in the
states with higher housing price volatilities compared to the lower housing
price volatilities states. Consequently, we focus on the dominant effect of
uncertainty over the labor demand shocks for each one of the groups, using
the 95th percentile of the State Uncertainty proxy. We choose the State
Uncertainty measure because we group the states according to the state-
specific housing price volatility; the results are qualitatively similar, however,
for the Macro Uncertainty measure. Table 3.4 shows the results for the three
different groups.
Table 3.4: Long-run Effects of Bartik and Interaction Term Grouped by the
Magnitude of the Housing Price Volatility Over Time
Housing Price Volatility low medium high
Bartik (B) B*1lowstate B B*1
medium
state B B*1
high
state
∆log(house price) 18.47** -6.85 7.055*** -9.26 21.26*** -25.0***
(7.802) (7.131) (2.596) (6.253) (6.899) (8.905)
Note: The long-run effects of bartik and interaction term based on State Uncertainty (95th
percentile threshold) are presented with corresponding standard errors in brackets grouped
by housing price volatility across states. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates
significance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level.
The most striking difference between the three groups is with respect to
the significance and the magnitude of our responsiveness measure (
→
β3) for
the high group. As one moves away from the low to high volatility group, the
interaction term (
→
β3) not only increases in absolute magnitude from −6.85 to
−25 but also becomes highly statistically significant. That is, the effect of a
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one standard deviation increase (i.e. 0.013%−points) in the interaction term
changes from −6.85×0.013= 0.09% in the low group to −25.0×0.013= 0.32%
of the housing price in the high group.
3.3.4 Grouping States by the Impact of Local Labor De-
mand Shocks
For the robustness check, we also sort groups by the impact of local labor
demand shocks. We calculate the impact of the bartik based on our model
(3.2) with housing prices as dependent variable, but estimating time-series
regressions for each state. We include states where the bartik has a signif-
icant impact (5% level) on the change in log housing prices, which results
in 37 states. We sort these 37 states into three groups of almost equal size,
depending on the magnitude of the bartik’s impact. Table 3.5 shows the
long-run effects of the bartik and the interaction term. By construction, the
impact of the bartik increases and is highly significant. The interaction
term, however, is only statistically significant for the group high, with the
sum of
→̂
β2 and
→̂
β3 (e.g.104.9−102= 2.9) very close to zero: the net effect on
the change in log housing prices is almost zero. Moreover, an explanation for
the dominance of uncertainty over the shock for the high group, in contrast
to the medium and low group, is that the larger the impact of the shock, the
less responsive households are, ceteris paribus.
Table 3.5: Long-run Effects of Bartik and Interaction Term Grouped by the
Impact of the Bartik in Each State
Bartik Index low medium high
Bartik (B) B*1lowState B B*1
medium
State B B*1
high
State
∆log(house price) 9.835*** -5.16 52.98*** -16.1 104.9*** -102**
(2.328) (5.947) (9.703) (14.43) (21.13) (45.07)
Note: The long-run effects of bartik and interaction term based on State Uncertainty (95th
percentile threshold) are presented with corresponding standard errors in brackets grouped
by housing price volatility across States. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates
significance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level.
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3.3.5 Robustness Checks
Our empirical results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications,
such as including a recession dummy, using different lag lengths, construct-
ing the Bartik index following Charles et al. (2013), scaling State Uncertainty
by the number of newspapers and normalizing it by dividing by the standard
deviation in each state, or omitting some of the variables from the vector
of controls variables.14 However, the results are not robust to omitting the
Great Recession period, i.e. using the sample from 1990M1 until 2007M12.
This may not be too surprising in light of Figure 3.3, which shows a lot of the
variation in the uncertainty dummy comes from the differences between the
time before and after 2008.
3.4 Conclusion
Our empirical results lend support for the real option effects in the U.S. hous-
ing market and are in line with some of the predictions of the theoretical
model of Bloom et al. (2007). Using the state-level panel data from 1990M1
to 2014M12, we show (i) uncertainty has a small but highly significant im-
pact on the level of housing prices but not on quantities, (ii) uncertainty
dominates the effects of (adverse) labor demand shocks and (iii) the results
are robust to changes in the threshold defining times of high uncertainty but
are somewhat sensitive to the choice of uncertainty proxy. We interpret this
result as the different proxies capturing different aspects of uncertainty, with
the proxy of Jurado et al. (2015) being well suited, due to its construction, to
capture the spells of uncertainty that induce macro-level real options effects.
These findings might be helpful for housing policy makers to mitigate adverse
effects of real shocks on housing markets during periods of high uncertainty
before they materialize.
14The robustness checks are available from the authors on request.
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Appendix
Data Appendix
Table 3.6: Uncertainty Proxies
Variable Availability Source Regional level
Macro Uncertainty 1960M1-2011M12 Jurado et al. (2015) National
Policy Uncertainty 1985M1-2015M2 Baker et al. (2016) National
State Uncertainty 2000M1-2014M12 Self constructed State
VIX 1990M1-2015M2 FRED National
Table 3.7: Dependent Variables
Variable Availability Source Regional level
House Price 1975M1-2014M12 Freddie&Mac State
Median Sales Price 1996M4-2014M12 Zillow Database State
% Selling For Loss 1998M1-2014M12 Zillow Database State
Total Turnover 1998M1-2014M12 Zillow Database State
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Table 3.8: Control Variables
Variable Availability Source Regional level
Federal Funds Rate 1954M7-2015M1 FRED State
Housing Starts 1988M1-2015M1 FRED State
Income 1950Q1-2014Q3 BEA State
Industrial Production 1919M1-2015M1 FRED National
Inflation Rate 1947M1-2015M1 FRED National
Population 1972-2013 FRED State
S&P 500 1970M1-2015M3 Datastream National
Unemployment Rate 1976M1-2014M12 FRED State
Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics of the Housing Market Variables.
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
house price 24480 125.5488 25.6362 61.0220 275.6024
∆log(house price) 24429 0.0002795 0.0073951 -0.1098976 0.0773649
Median Sales Price 7790 191184.8 74180.34 47519.08 518470.1
∆log(Median Sales Price) 7751 0.001178 0.025107 -0.256864 0.308221
% Selling For Loss 7234 12.8908 13.5806 0.0612 70.5068
∆% Selling For Loss 7158 0.107329 1.18954 -15.6326 16.4346
Turnover 7308 4.81494 2.253468 0.008869 17.16583
∆Turnover 7271 0.0032471 0.106966 -12.71301 2.019346
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Table 3.10: Descriptive Statistics of the Uncertainty Measures and the
bartik.
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Macro Uncertainty 264*51 0.67773 0.0961123 0.568981 1.130619
Policy Uncertainty 300*51 106.3401 34.38186 57.20262 245.1267
State Uncertainty 9180 18.23878 7.730284 0 233
VIX 300*51 19.9604 7.730284 10.82 62.64
bartik 15249 -0.000041 0.0001304 -0.002793 0.0009686
Sorted States in Subsection 3.3.3
Table 3.11: Sorted States, According to their Unconditional Housing Price
Volatility over Time.
low medium high
Alabama Alaska Arizona
Arkansas Colorado California
Georgia Delaware Connecticut
Iowa Idaho District of Columbia
Indiana Illinois Florida
Kansas Louisiana Hawaii
Kentucky Maine Massachusetts
Missouri Michigan Maryland
Mississippi Minnesota New Hampshire
North Carolina Montana New Jersey
Nebraska North Dakota Nevada
New Mexico Oklahoma New York
Ohio Pennsylvania Oregon
South Carolina Texas Rhode Island
South Dakota Utah Virginia
Tennessee Vermont Washington
Wisconsin West Virginia Wyoming
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Sorted States in Subsection 3.3.4
Table 3.12: Sorted States, According to the Impact of the bartik in Each
State.
low medium high
Colorado Arkansas Alaska
Georgia Kansas Arizona
Iowa Massachusetts District of Columbia
Illinois Maryland Delaware
Kentucky Minnesota Hawaii
Louisiana Missouri Maine
Michigan North Dakota New Hampshire
Mississippi Nebraska New Mexico
North Dakota New Jersey Oregon
New York South Carolina South Dakota
Oklahoma Virginia West Virginia
Tennessee Washington Wyoming
Texas
CHAPTER 4
Uncertainty and Trade
This chapter consists of two sections. Section 4.1 quantifies the impact of
macroeconomic uncertainty shocks on disaggregated German import flows
using a classification scheme1 from the German Engineering Association
(www.vdma.org), which categorizes manufacturing goods into intermediate
and final goods. In order to enhance the understanding of this classification
scheme, section 4.22 applies this scheme to European trade data and provides
descriptive statistics as well as causality analyses of trade flows of the EU-27
countries.
4.1 Uncertainty and Trade: Evidence from Ger-
many
Abstract: This paper quantifies the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty
shocks on the disaggregated German import flows. Structural VAR (SVAR)
estimations reveal that a one standard deviation increase in macroeconomic
uncertainty induces a decline in total import, import of intermediate man-
ufacturing goods and import of final manufacturing goods by 1.04%, 1.43%
and 1.44%, respectively. The findings suggest that uncertainty shocks in one
1I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Richard Frensch and the Institute for East and Eastern
European Studies in Regensburg (IOS) for sharing their data with me.
2This section is based on joint work with Stephan Huber and was published in a journal
(Huber and Thanh, 2017).
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country affect production in another through the trade channel.
4.1.1 Introduction
Uncertainty shocks are considered to be an important driver of the real econ-
omy. Christiano et al. (2014) argue that time-varying uncertainty is the most
important driver of the business cycle and other studies suggest a decline in
investment in response to uncertainty shocks (e.g., Bernanke, 1983; Bloom,
2009; Meinen and Roehe, 2017). In the same vein, Karnizova and Li (2014)
find that the economic policy uncertainty measure proposed by Baker et al.
(2016) is a robust predictor of U.S. recessions. Moreover, Leduc and Liu (2016)
show that an increase in uncertainty induces a rise in the unemployment
rate and Dorofeenko et al. (2014) conclude that uncertainty shocks account
for over 90% of the U.S. house price volatility.
While most studies focus on the impact of uncertainty within a coun-
try, there are also works on the cross-border effects of uncertainty shocks.
Colombo (2013) estimates Structural Vector Autogregression (SVAR) models
and documents that a one standard deviation U.S. economic policy uncer-
tainty shock decreases European industrial production by 0.12%. Similarly,
the SVAR estimations of Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2015) show that a one
standard deviation increase in the volatility of U.S. real activity shocks leads
to a 1% decline in U.K. GDP.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear through which channel(s) a domestic
uncertainty shock affects real activity in foreign economies. The current pa-
per seeks to clarify this question and investigates whether the trade channel
plays an important role in transmitting uncertainty shocks in one country
on production in another. The theoretical model of Novy and Taylor (2014)
predicts that manufacturing firms cut the import of intermediate goods in
response to a rise in uncertainty, while Bloom (2014) suggests the rise of
precautionary savings and thus lesser consumption which, in turn, trans-
lates into a decrease of the import of final consumption goods during periods
of high uncertainty. Using German disaggregated trade data, I empirically
test these two predictions. SVAR estimations indicate that a one standard
deviation increase in uncertainty lowers the import of intermediate manufac-
turing goods, the import of final manufacturing goods and the total volume
of import in the middle-run by 1.43%, 1.44% and 1.04%, respectively.
Subsection 4.1.2 presents the data and the estimation specification, while
subsection 4.1.3 presents the estimation results. Finally, subsection 4.1.4
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concludes.
4.1.2 Data and Econometric Specification
I use disaggregated Combined Nomenclature 8 digit-level monthly Comext
trade data from Eurostat from 1996M6 to 2015M33 and a classification
scheme from the German Engineering Association (www.vdma.org) that cat-
egorizes traded manufacturing goods into parts, components and final goods.
In this section, I interpret both parts and components as intermediate goods.
On average, 11% of total import is classified as the import of manufactur-
ing goods. Table 4.3 in the Appendix of section 4.2 shows examples of the
most traded intermediate and final goods and section 4.2 provides a detailed
discussion on this classification scheme and the disaggregated trade data.
Furthermore, I use a measure for the German macroeconomic uncertainty
(German Macro Uncertainty) which is analogous the Macro Uncertainty pro-
posed by Jurado et al. (2015), but proxies the average uncertainty of German
macroeconomic series. German Macro Uncertainty is provided by Meinen
and Roehe (2017) who use 143 macroeconomic time series for the computa-
tion. This measure captures the predictability of the overall macroeconomic
environment; the less predictable the macroeconomic variables, the higher
the macroeconomic uncertainty. I use the one-month-ahead measure, since
the data are at a monthly frequency. Using a similar measure for macroeco-
nomic uncertainty which is proposed by Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015) leads
to the same conclusions4.
I also include the DAX, the German industrial production in the manu-
facturing section (production) and the German employment (employment)
in the SVAR estimation. These data were collected from Thomson Reuters
Datastream. The import data, production and employment are seasonally
adjusted, and all variables are Hodrick-Prescott (HP) detrended (λ=129,600),
analogous to Bloom (2009) and Novy and Taylor (2014).
I use the following SVAR representation:
B0 yt =B(L)yt−p+ e t, (4.1)
3The Macro Uncertainty measure is not available for earlier periods.
4The estimation results are presented in the Appendix.
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where yt =

log(DAX )
German Macro Uncertainty
log(production)
log(employment)
log(importvariable)

t
, e t is the vector of structural inno-
vations, B(L) an autoregressive lag-polynomia and B0 the matrix containing
the contemporaneous relationships between the reduced-form residuals and
the structural innovations. I use a standard Cholesky decomposition impos-
ing a lower triangular matrix to identify B0. Following Bloom (2009) and
Novy and Taylor (2014), I use the ordering5 log(DAX ), German Macro Un-
certainty, log(production), log(employment) and log(importvariable). I
follow the recommendation of the Schwarz Criterion and decided to choose
two lags in the benchmark specification. However, the results are robust to
alternative lag specifications.
4.1.3 Estimation Results
Figure 4.1 depicts the impulse response functions of the import variables to a
one standard deviation shock to German Macro Uncertainty. A one standard
deviation increase in German Macro Uncertainty significantly lowers the
import of intermediate manufacturing goods and final manufacturing goods
as well as the total volume of import in the middle-run, reaching a maximum
level of impact of 1.43%, 1.44% and 1.04%, respectively. The reduction of the
import of intermediate goods in response to an increase in uncertainty is in
line with the prediction of the model of Novy and Taylor (2014). In the model,
firms face fixed costs of ordering from abroad and thus store intermediate
goods according to an inventory policy. Firms respond to uncertainty shocks
by contracting their inventory policy and cutting their import of intermediate
goods. On the other hand, the decline of the import of final goods indicates the
rise of precautionary savings and therefore lower consumption as suggested
by Bloom (2014). It is worth nothing that the reactions of the import of
intermediate goods and the import of final goods to an uncertainty shock are
qualitatively and quantitatively similar. This observation indicates that the
cutting of foreign import of intermediate goods is similar to the reduction of
consumption of goods from abroad. Moreover, while Bloom (2009) finds that
following an uncertainty shock output, employment and productivity decline
5The main results are robust to alternative order specifications.
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Figure 4.1: Impulse Response Function of Import Variables
to a German Macro Uncertainty Shock
Note: The sample period is 1996M6-2015M7. The figure displays the
response of import variables to a one standard deviation German Macro
Uncertainty shock. The shaded areas denote the 95% confidence inter-
vals from multivariate parametric bootstrap procedures with 2000 repli-
cations.
for some periods and overshoot in the recovery phase, the import variables
do not show a comparable overshooting reaction.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the relative importance of a German Macro Un-
certainty innovation in explaining the forecast error variance of the import
variables. The forecast error variance decomposition confirms the finding
that the impact of a German Macro Uncertainty shock is more important in
the middle-run and not in the short-run. There is a very low level of contri-
bution of an innovation in German Macro Uncertainty to the total forecast
error variances of the import variables in the first 5 months, but the levels
of contribution rise sharply in the middle-run and reach 35% (intermediate
goods), 25% (final goods) and 33% (total volume of import) after 15 months.
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Figure 4.2: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Due to an
Innovation in German Macro Uncertainty
Note: The sample period is 1996M6-2015M3. The shaded areas denote
the 95% confidence intervals from multivariate parametric bootstrap pro-
cedures with 2000 replications.
4.1.4 Conclusion
I use German data to investigate the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty
on import flows. SVAR estimations reveal that a rise in Macro Uncertainty
lowers the import of intermediate manufacturing goods, final manufacturing
goods and the total volume of import. The magnitude of reaction to an uncer-
tainty shock of the import of intermediate goods is comparable to the one of
the import of final goods. The reduction of import following an uncertainty
shock in a country equates with a lower export of its trade partners which
cools down the production in those partner countries. This mechanism helps
to understand why there are cross-border spillover effects of uncertainty
shocks.
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Appendix
Data Appendix
• Disaggregated trade data are collected from Eurostat
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/de/data/database).
• German Macro Uncertainty is provided by Meinen and Roehe (2017)
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292116302239).
• Macroeconomic uncertainty by Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015): the au-
thors propose an alternative measure of macroeconomic uncertainty
which quantifies the unpredictable components of GDP. They extract
the unforecastable component from GDP and, subsequently, evaluate
the cumulative density of forecast errors at the actual realized forecast
error. Meinen and Roehe (2017) follow the approach of Rossi and Sekh-
posyan (2015) and calculate for a wide range of macroeconomic vari-
ables a corresponding uncertainty measure and compute the arithmetic
mean across all uncertainty series. This arithmetic mean measure of
uncertainty, which is based on a multitude of macroeconomic variables,
is used for the computation of 4.3. This measure for Germany is pro-
vided by Meinen and Roehe (2017)
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292116302239).
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Figure 4.3: Response of Import Variables to a One Standard
Deviation Macroeconomic Uncertainty Shock Which Is Pro-
posed by Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015)
Note: The sample period is 1996M7-2015M3. The macroeconomic uncer-
tainty measure by Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015) for Germany is computed
and provided by Meinen and Roehe (2017).
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4.2 Vertical Specialization in the EU and the
Causality of Trade.
Abstract: We6 use a novel classification scheme to identify three stages of
production in the manufacturing sector: parts, components, and final goods.
In particular, we offer evidence on the revealed comparative advantage of
the EU-27 countries concerning the three vertically separated stages of pro-
duction. Moreover, we investigate whether, and if so how, imports of parts,
and components can work as a predictor for the exports of final goods. We
find that countries specialize at different stages of production, and that com-
ponents are Granger causal for the export of final goods in many countries
with a lag of three months.
Acknowledgement to prior publication in Appplied Economics Letters:
This section is joint work with Stephan Huber and was published in Ap-
plied Economics Letters, 2017, 24 (5), 329-333, copyright Taylor & Francis,
available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1186791
6We are grateful to the Institute for East and Eastern European Studies in Regensburg
(IOS) for sharing their data with us. In particular, we are grateful to Richard Frensch,
Volkhart Vincentz as well as all IOS-seminar participants.
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4.2.1 Introduction
The share of intermediates in intra-EU trade is increasing and reaches al-
most 50% nowadays.7 Although some widely received articles, such as Hum-
mels et al. (2001), Feenstra (1998), or Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006),
have addressed the issue of how countries specialize along the vertical produc-
tion chain, surprisingly little is known about the comparative advantage and
the causal interrelationship of international trade in parts, components, and
final goods. The research gap can be explained with a lack of data that allows
to distinguish traded goods at vertically separated stages of production that
goes beyond the dichotomy of ‘parts&components’ and ‘final goods’. We aim to
fill this gap by using a novel categorization scheme compiled by experts of the
German Engineering Association (www.vdma.org), which categorizes traded
manufacturing goods at the highly disaggregated CN-8 digit-level into three
vertically separated stages of production: (1) parts, (2) components, and (3)
final goods. Overall, we identify 245 products as parts, 329 products as com-
ponents, and 1058 products as final goods within the manufacturing sector.8
This trisection allows us to overview the comparative advantage of countries
at different stages of production and to investigate whether the imports of
parts and components can help to predict exports of goods at the final stage
of assembling.
In our analysis, we employ Granger causality tests revealing that imports
of parts and components help to predict the export of final goods. This holds
especially true for countries with a high revealed comparative advantage
in the export of final goods. However, the import of components are often
sufficient to improve the prediction about exports of final goods. The chosen
lag length is quite often three month, which can be interpret as the time it
takes to assemble and export a final good. The causal impact of less differen-
tiated imports in parts, however, seems to play a minor role. The intuition of
this result is that components have a smaller range of use in the production
system and hence are often specifically build to work as a preliminary input
7We refer to Guerrieri and Caffarelli (2012) for an overview how the international frag-
mentation of production has developed.
8Parts contains commodities like electronic instruments, mechanical seals, sewing ma-
chine needles with single flat shank, and spinning rings. The intermediate class components
contains commodities such as engines and motors, air conditioning machines, temperature
regulators, or articulated shafts. Final goods classify manufacturing commodities such as
gas turbines, digger, lifts, or mobile cranes. For some further examples of the categorisation
we refer to Table 4.3 in the Appendix.
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for a small range of final manufacturing goods.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Subsection 4.2.2 in-
troduces the data and offers some descriptive facts concerning the countries’
revealed comparative advantage. Subsection 4.2.3 asks, whether imports of
parts and components are Granger causal for exporting final goods. Subsec-
tion 4.2.4 concludes.
4.2.2 Data and Comparative Advantage
We use de-seasonalized (X-12-ARIMA adjusted) monthly COMEXT trade
data from Eurostat from 1988M1 to 2015M8 for 27 EU countries. Table 4.1
contains the number of observations for each country, which vary from 188
to 332, as well as the share of exports and imports captured by parts (p),
components (c), and final goods ( f ), which vary from about three percent
(Ireland and Greece) to over twenty percent (Italy and Germany9).
Table 4.1 contains the Revealed Comparative Advantage index (RCA)10
for parts, components, and other goods (o) for exports and imports, respec-
tively. We calculate the RCA using the average export and import flows from
2004 to 2013. In this time span our sample is balanced and it is long enough
to smooth out disturbing effects from temporarily economic shocks. The re-
sults reveal that some countries, like Austria, Germany, Denmark, Finland,
Italy, and Sweden do have a general comparative advantage in exports of
manufacturing goods, while other countries, like Czech Republic, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia specialize only in earlier stages of produc-
tion.
An interesting observation is Germany, since recent literature, such as
Sinn (2006), emphasize that Germany is a ‘bazaar economy’ which imports
early stages of production to assemble them and export final goods. Our re-
sults support this hypothesis: Germany has a RCA in importing parts (1.21)
and components (1.18) and a relative high RCA in exporting final goods (1.52)
compared to the RCA in exporting parts (1.23) and components (1.4). The
RCA of Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia in the export of components is also
remarkably high. This could be driven by some large firms of the automotive
industry who offshore early and intermediate stages of production into these
9Germany is denoted as “DEU".
10It is defined by RCA i j = xi j /
∑
j xi j∑
i xi j /
∑
j
∑
i xi j
, where xi j denotes the exports or imports in good
class i of the declaring country j.
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countries.
Table 4.1: Revealed Comparative Advantage in Parts, Components and Final
Goods
RCAexp RCA
ex
c RCA
ex
f RCA
ex
o RCA
im
p RCA
im
c RCA
im
f RCA
im
o SEx SIm Obs.
AUT 1.22 1.22 1.35 .95 1.41 1.54 1.48 .95 .21 .157 248
BEL .64 .65 .46 1.07 .77 .83 .76 1.02 .078 .079 200
BGR .58 .79 .52 1.07 .85 .72 1.35 .99 .086 .115 188
CYP .16 .08 .46 1.11 .46 .41 .92 1.03 .048 .077 188
CZE 1.37 1 .98 .99 1.38 1.35 1.25 .97 .168 .14 188
DEU 1.23 1.4 1.52 .93 1.21 1.18 1.05 .99 .231 .108 332
DNK 1.39 1.17 1.28 .96 1.3 1.37 1.16 .98 .194 .124 332
ESP .55 .54 .63 1.06 .77 .89 .91 1.01 .085 .095 332
EST .73 .24 .75 1.05 .63 .72 1.3 1 .096 .107 188
FIN 1.22 1.03 1.48 .95 1.12 1.23 1.15 .98 .193 .121 248
FRA .77 .88 .7 1.04 .96 .96 1.01 1 .106 .099 332
GBR .92 .79 .79 1.03 .87 .83 .93 1.01 .128 .093 332
GRC .22 .12 .33 1.11 .5 .48 .77 1.04 .035 .077 332
HUN .95 .82 .76 1.03 1.32 1.53 1.8 .94 .12 .18 188
IRL .41 .14 .24 1.11 .79 .47 .73 1.03 .034 .072 332
ITA 1.51 1.69 1.59 .91 .86 1.08 .86 1.01 .256 .09 332
LTU .32 .43 .65 1.07 .63 .61 1.1 1.01 .079 .09 188
LUX .86 .81 .31 1.07 .81 .57 .59 1.04 .078 .066 200
LVA .33 .38 .65 1.07 .65 .7 1.31 1 .076 .109 188
MLT .4 .18 .36 1.1 .65 .33 .78 1.03 .043 .07 188
NLD .92 .45 .61 1.05 1.03 .67 .7 1.02 .088 .077 332
POL .63 .66 .84 1.04 .94 1.2 1.45 .97 .115 .134 188
PRT .33 1.01 .57 1.06 .7 .64 .95 1.02 .073 .091 332
ROM .84 1.21 .52 1.05 1.18 1.05 1.46 .97 .104 .139 188
SVK .82 1.07 .55 1.05 1.05 1.11 1.08 .99 .104 .113 188
SVN 1.2 .88 .93 1 .92 1.02 1.1 1 .152 .109 188
SWE 1.33 1.31 1.01 .98 1.28 1.32 1.22 .97 .178 .135 248
SEx and SIm denote the share of total export and the share of total import which is catego-
rized as manufacturing goods, respectively.
4.2.3 Causality
In this section, we ask whether imports of preliminary and intermediate
goods are Granger causal for the exports of final goods. To investigate whether
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the import of parts (imp) and components (imc) is Granger causal for the
export of final goods (ex f ), we estimate for each country:
∆log(ex f )t =β0+
p∑
j=1
∆log(imp)t− jβ j
+
p∑
j=1
∆log(imc)t− jγ j
+
p∑
j=1
∆log(ex f )t− jδ j+ut. (4.2)
whereby we use the Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz information criterion (SIC) to
choose an appropriate lag length p. In order to test the relevance of imp and
imc, respectively, we employ two tests: The first one is a Granger causality
test with:
H0 :β1 = ·· · =βp = γ1 = ·· · = γp = 0. (4.3)
The second test checks whether an increase of imports in parts and compo-
nents lead to an increase of exports of final goods:
H0 :β1+·· ·+βp+γ1+·· ·+γp ≤ 0. (4.4)
If both tests can be rejected, imp and imc are positive Granger causal for
ex f .
Instead of presenting 27 regressions and its corresponding test statistics,
we summarize our results in Table 4.2. The fourth column denotes the results
for estimating and testing equation (4.2). To test whether the imports of parts
or components solely determine the exports of final goods, we show in the
second and third column the results for specifications which omit from our
baseline specification components (im2) and parts (im1), respectively. We
abbreviate the results as follows: a star (∗) indicates a rejection of the first
test, a plus (+) denotes a rejection of the second test, both at a 5% significance
level. The superscript number denotes the chosen lag length following the
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) and the Akaike information criterion
(AIC). The table contains results for both selection criteria, whereby the
results for the AIC are shown in brackets.
Following the SIC, imports of parts are positive Granger causal for Italy
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Table 4.2: Summary of the Causality Analysis using SIC (AIC)
imp → ex f imc → ex f imp,c → ex f
AUT *2(*+6) 2(*9) *2(*+9)
BEL *3(*+4) 3(+6) *3(*+4)
BGR 1(2) 1(2) 1(2)
CYP 3(6) 2(6) 2(6)
CZE 3(+5) 3(*+4) 3(*+4)
DEU 3(+4) *+3(*+5) *+3(*+4)
DNK 2(4) 2(*4) *2(*4)
ESP +2(+3) *+3(*+9) 2(*+3)
EST 2(+2) *+2(*+9) 1(*+9)
FIN 2(*+6) 2(*+10) 1(*+7)
FRA *3(*10) *+3(*+10) *+3(*+8)
GBR *2(*12) *+3(*+9) *+3(*+9)
GRC *7(*12) +7(+12) *+7(*12)
HUN *3(*5) 1(12) 1(*+5)
IRL 2(2) 2(8) 2(2)
ITA *+3(*+8) *+3(*+8) *+3(*+8)
LTU 1(+5) 1(4) 1(1)
LUX *3(*+7) 3(5) *3(7)
LVA 2(*5) 2(*7) 2(*+7)
MLT *6(*11) +6(+10) *+6(+10)
NLD 2(2) 2(*3) *2(*3)
POL *2(*4) *3(*4) 1(*4)
PRT 2(3) *2(*3) *2(3)
ROM 2(+2) 2(2) 2(2)
SVK 3(+4) 2(+6) +3(+4)
SVN +1(+11) 1(*12) 1(*12)
SWE 2(*+6) *+3(*+6) *3(*+6)
* indicates Granger causality at 5% level, + indicates that overall effect is positive at 5%
level, the superscript denotes the chosen lag length, the test results using the AIC criterion
are displayed in brackets.
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and imports of components are positive Granger causal for Germany, Spain,
Estonia, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden. With the exception of
France and Great Britain, the results reveal that it is more likely to yield
significant results for countries that have a comparative advantage in the
export of final goods. For Estonia, the superior lag length is two, for all other
countries it is three. This can be interpret as the time it takes for components
to be assembled to final goods and in turn be exported. As the last column
shows, the common inclusion of imports of parts and components yields sig-
nificant and positive Granger causalities for Germany, France, Great Britain,
Greece, Italy, and Malta. However, these Granger causalities are mostly
driven by the imports of components, as the previous results can tell.
To explain the fact that we fail to find (positive) Granger causalities for
all countries, one has to consider the nature and the limitations of our data:
First, for some countries, the time series is rather short. This makes it diffi-
cult to find robust results, especially because we apply robust Newey-West11
standard errors in our autoregressive model. More sophisticated models
would require further information, such as which manufacturing parts are
used to produce certain components and final goods. Second, imports of
parts and components are not the only input-source to produce final goods.
However, our data does not allow to capture non-manufacturing inputs from
abroad or inputs that are not imported. Thus, it is unlikely to find causal-
ity for countries that export only a small share of their exports within the
manufacturing goods that we capture with part, components, and final goods.
This share is shown for the imports and the exports in Table 4.1. Third, we
cannot control for the imports of parts and components that are used for self
consumption and not to produce final goods for the export sector.
4.2.4 Concluding Remarks
This letter provides novel evidence on the export and import specialization
concerning three different stages of production for EU-27 countries. More-
over, this paper shows that a more detailed classification of traded goods yield
significant improvements of the prediction of exports of final goods, because
it is predominantly the import of components that drives the exports of final
goods. Parts, however, seem to play a minor role. Thus, countries with a
revealed comparative advantage in the export of final goods tend to import
11See Newey and West (1987).
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parts and components in order to assemble and export final goods. Of course,
the results are borne by a simple empirical model and the time series are
rather short for some countries. Nevertheless, we think our exercise helps to
understand the global production sharing process further. Overall, we hope
that this letter encourages future empiricism to apply more elaborated and
detailed classification schemes.
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Appendix
Data Appendix
Table 4.3: Example of Goods Categorized as Parts, Components or Final
Goods
nc Description
Parts:
84159000 parts of air conditioning machines, comprising a motor-driven fan and elements f
84799080 parts of machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions, n.e.s.
84219900 parts of machinery and apparatus for filtering or purifying liquids or gases, n.
84819000 parts of valves and similar articles for pipes, boiler shells, tanks, vats or th
84139100 parts of pumps for liquids, n.e.s.
84149000 parts of : air or vacuum pumps, air or other gas compressors, fans and ventilati
84314980 parts of machinery of heading 8426, 8429 and 8430, n.e.s.
84119900 parts of gas turbines, n.e.s.
Components:
82090020 inserts, indexable, for tools, unmounted, of sintered metal carbide or cermets
84818011 mixing valves for sinks, washbasins, bidets, water cisterns, baths and similar f
84148011 turbocompressors, single-stage (excl. compressors for refrigerating equipment an
84821090 ball bearings with greatest external diameter, 30 mm
84195000 heat-exchange units (excl. instantaneous heaters, storage water heaters, boilers
84812010 valves for the control of oleohydraulic power transmission
84807100 injection or compression-type moulds for rubber or plastics
84835080 flywheels and pulleys, incl. pulley blocks (excl. of cast iron or cast steel)
Final Goods:
94036090 wooden furniture (excl. for offices or shops, kitchens, dining rooms, living roo
84433210 printers capable of connecting to an automatic data processing machine or to a n
84295210 self-propelled track-laying excavators, with a 360 °revolving superstructure
84099900 parts suitable for use solely or principally with compression-ignition internal
84862090 machines and apparatus for the manufacture of semiconductor devices or of electr
87084050 gear boxes for tractors, motor vehicles for the transport of ten or more persons
87019039 agricultural tractors and forestry tractors, wheeled, new, of an engine power
84798997 other
This table shows the eight most traded goods in the year 2012 within the respective goods
category.
CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
The goal of this dissertation is to expand the understanding of the impact
of economic uncertainty on economic activities by analyzing empirical data.
There are robust and significant negative effects of uncertainty on financial,
housing and trade markets, which indicate the occurrence of real options
effects in those markets during periods of high uncertainty.
In chapter 2, time series estimations reveal that economic uncertainty
shocks substantially impede the number of U.S. initial public offerings. Both
the reduction of newly filed IPOs and the increase of withdrawn IPOs con-
tribute to the overall decrease of the number of IPOs. Moreover, high eco-
nomic uncertainty also depresses the IPO market condition variables, such as
output, stock market growth and investor sentiment. Since high uncertainty
shocks often persist for multiple quarters, they can hamper IPO issues for
a considerable amount of periods and, thus, create cold IPO market phases.
As high uncertainty dissolves, IPO-interested firms may want to go public
in the same periods which could, in turn, generate hot IPO market phases.
The described connection between uncertainty and the IPO timing provides
an alternative and complementary explanation for the existence of IPO issue
cycles.
Chapter 3 illuminates the impact of economic uncertainty on the housing
market using a U.S. state level panel data set. We find a significant negative
impact of uncertainty on the housing prices. Moreover, during periods of
high uncertainty, housing market variables, such as housing price, median
sell price, turnover rate and percentage of houses sold for loss are less re-
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sponsive to labor demand shocks than in periods of low uncertainty. This
finding suggests that the effect of uncertainty shocks dominates that of labor
demand shocks and indicates that housing market variables react differently
in periods of high uncertainty, which should be taken into account by policy
makers.
Finally, chapter 4 quantifies the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty
on German disaggregated import flows with SVAR estimations. The results
indicate that an increase in uncertainty reduces the import of intermediate
and final manufacturing goods as well as the total volume of import. The
reduction of imports following an uncertainty shock offers a possible expla-
nation for the question of why an uncertainty shock in one country affects
economic activity in another.
For future research, further analyses on the lower responsiveness of eco-
nomic agents to changes in the economic environment during periods of high
economic uncertainty might be fruitful. In light of the findings of this disser-
tation, I conjecture that, for example, the impact of fiscal stimulus packages
or monetary policy is less effective during times of high uncertainty. Fur-
thermore, it might be rewarding to study the nonlinear effects of uncertainty
shocks, since the effects of an increase in uncertainty may not be symmet-
rical with the effects of a decline in uncertainty. Other fertile ground for
continuing research might be the identification of potential methods which
could help to reduce the level of uncertainty. For instance, creditable policy
commitment may remove the layer of uncertainty and encourage economic
activity.
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